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Abstract I 
Abstract 
 
This master thesis looks at how audit regulations is changed in the EU with special emphasis 
on the implementation process of the Statutory Audit Directive (SAD) into Germany. Various 
crises, the increasing globalisation as well as the aim of the European Commission to 
establish a harmonised capital market have led to continuous changes of the audit regulatory 
framework in the EU. The most recent change was thereby the SAD which has far-reaching 
impacts on the national audit systems of its Member States. Germany is taken here as a case 
country. The areas of the SAD which most affected Germany were cooperation, public 
oversight and quality assurance. 
The purpose of this thesis is to look more specifically at the implications the SAD has for the 
German audit regulatory system with focus on the public oversight requirements. This 
research will be supplemented by several different theories, namely crisis management, 
institutional theory, travel of ideas, and auditing culture. The main empirical data has been 
obtained through extensive documentary research, and in addition, a telephone interview with 
the vice-chairman of the German auditor oversight committee. 
The analysis showed that the anticipatory model can help to explain how audit regulations 
change in the EU. Factors, like differing expectations and the relevant audit environments 
influence what counteractive strategies are implemented. The SAD symbolizes thereby a 
counteractive strategy of the EU to regain the trust of investors into the capital markets again. 
The implementation of a public oversight is an important requirement but at the same time 
presents a challenge for national legislators by incorporating it into the their audit regulatory 
system. 
The main conclusion of this research is hence that the SAD has led to major changes in the 
audit regulatory system of the EU Member States that will help to make the capital markets 
more secure and lead to more cooperation among each other. It remains however to be seen 
how well that new system will work with the emergence of another major crisis. 
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1. Chapter One: Problem Statement 
1.1 Introduction 
The modern function of auditing has existed ever since the capital market has started to 
emerge in the end of the 19th century. It is described as "the process of providing assurance 
about the reliability of the information contained in a financial statement prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles or other rules." (Soltani, 2007:4) 
There is however a distinction between the simple audit agreed between at least two parties 
and a statutory audit. The latter one describes an audit of financial statements as required by 
European Community law. That means a statutory auditor has to be approved in accordance 
with the respective Community law by a competent authority in order to carry out any 
statutory work. (EU, 2006)  
The role of a statutory auditor is thereby influenced by the fast-changing environment of the 
various capital markets as well as by regulatory bodies. Each country has its own national 
laws and regulations but with the increasing harmonization of the capital market, regulatory 
bodies and governments started to cooperate and work together on finding a common basis 
for auditing regulations. The EU, where there is extensive cooperation between Member 
States, is a prime example of this. Its market environment is characterised by common 
regulations and European bodies that deal with coordinating the various issues arising in the 
volatile business world.  
The increasing number of financial scandals in the last two decades as well as the 
contemporary financial crisis has however raised fundamental questions about the way capital 
markets are regulated and supervised. In such times of crises, investors and other market users 
would normally rely on auditors to restore the trust into the capital market again because they 
are responsible to ensure the true and fair financial statements of business organizations and 
therewith make the capital market reliable. Auditing scandals, like Arthur Andersen (2002) 
and the Parmalat audit (2004) have however made it more difficult for the public to believe 
that only this profession can make the capital market trustworthy again. For this reason 
regulatory bodies started among others to discuss about improving accounting and auditing 
standards and about establishing an efficient and transparent securities market system. That 
means the introduction of a new regulatory and legal environment, and a corporate 
accountability framework that would be globally recognized. (Braiotta, 2005) More precisely, 
it means to enhance the audit quality, restore the trust of investors into the audits of 
companies and define more specifically what is required of regulators, legislators and 
auditors. (Holmquist, 2008) In the United States, the strict framework of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
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Act (SOX) has for instance been introduced in 2002 as one consequence of the catastrophic 
scandals of Enron and WorldCom. The European Union in contrast has long debated in what 
way the broad framework of the EU 8th Directive from 19841 could be improved. In 1996, the 
Commission had reflected on further actions in regard to the duties of statutory auditors in 
their Green Paper "The Role, Position, and Liability of the Statutory Auditor in the EU". Also, 
further Communication documents proposed the creation of an EU Committee on Auditing 
(1998) and improvements on quality assurance for statutory audit work (2000). (EC, 2003) As 
result of this process it was decided that a modernised 8th Directive should be developed that 
was strongly focused on the environment and proceedings of auditing firms (EU, 2004). That 
means a greater scope on issues like quality assurance, auditors' independence, robust 
professional ethics and the overall use of international standards of auditing (ISA). The 
directive has been passed by the European Parliament and the Council on 17 May 2006 and 
should be adopted in all Member Stated of the EU before 29 June 2008. (EU, 2006) The 
modernised EU 8th Directive is nowadays often called the Statutory Audit Directive (SAD). 
This new directive is not just better structured and provides more limitations to the work of 
auditors than the initial one from 1984, but also enables each Member State to find the 
appropriate measures to implement the EU requirements into their national legislation. That 
would be for instance for Italy law number 262 and for Germany the new law called 
'Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz' (BilMoG). (Kling, 2008) It is however now the question 
to what degree auditing firms can with the implementation of the provisions of the SAD be 
able to play a greater role in restoring trust into the capital market again.  
 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The aim of this master thesis is thus to analyse how the Statutory Audit Directive affects 
regulation in the field of auditing and how much a crisis and other triggering factors have an 
effect on changing existing regulation or establishing new regulation. I have chosen Germany 
as a case study to examine this. The reason for this lies firstly in Germany being one of the 
most powerful countries in the EU, and secondly in the considerable change of the 
Commercial Code German legislators had to make in order to follow the requirements of the 
SAD. That considerable change has been adopted by the German legislators in April 2009, 
and its application will be compulsory for all coming financial years after 31 December 2009. 
                                                 
1
 The old EU 8th directive from 1984 will be referred to as 'EU 8th directive' throughout this master thesis. The 
modernised EU 8th directive will in contrast be referred to as 'Statutory Audit Directive'. 
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German auditors and regulatory committees however do not know exactly how much impact 
the implementation of the SAD will have on the German auditing profession. My research 
will thus contribute to providing a summarized information base for mainly German auditing 
firms when dealing with this new situation. It is a fact that most European accounting and 
auditing firms do not know the whole extent of how a European directive or regulation came 
into being, let alone know about the new internationally established institutions. I hope that 
with the results of this master thesis, I can help to bring these topics into more focus and to 
highlight the necessity of harmonised rules and regulation for the globalized world we are 
living in. 
 
For that reason, I have formulated my problem statement in the following way: 
 
How is audit regulation changed in the EU? 
A case study of the implementation process of the SAD in Germany. 
 
In order to approach this topic in an efficient way, I have furthermore formulated three 
research questions that will help me to find more answers to the above mentioned problem 
statement. In addition, an interview with a representative of the German auditor oversight 
committee (APAK) will provide me with further insight to the implementation process of the 
Statutory Audit Directive and the German auditing profession. 
 
These questions are: 
1. Why has the Statutory Audit Directive been developed in the EU?  
2. How is the implementation of the Statutory Audit Directive affecting German 
audit regulation? 
3. How is that process affecting the auditor oversight in Germany? 
 
Audit regulations are changing over time, and are thereby influenced by external pressure or 
the culture of the profession itself. External pressure on the one hand could come from 
regulatory bodies, and their different traditions of implementing laws, or from triggering 
events like crises or financial collapses. The culture of the auditing profession on the other 
hand explains what cultural factors influence the regulatory system inside a country, and to 
what degree audit regulations need to be made comparable. (Zeff, 2007) 
It is thus the case that auditing firms and regulatory bodies have to anticipate changes in the 
existing frameworks. In the course of this thesis, attention will particularly be placed on 
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investigating the factor of crisis as a trigger for the development of a new audit regulation. 
Moreover, analyzing crisis regulation is essential to understand why the SAD has been 
introduced and to see how it has then been implemented into Germany as Member State of the 
EU. The whole SAD implementation process has in fact just been completed in Germany, 
thus, it is of special interest to see what effects that process will have on the German 
regulatory system. 
Another limitation of this master thesis is in regard to the content of the SAD. It looks at 
various issues like quality assurance, public oversight and cooperation with countries inside 
and outside of the EU. Due to the abundance of information about each of these topics, I have 
decided to concentrate on public oversight. It had the most important impact on changing 
national regulation in Germany and introduces a new independent body into the already 
existing regulatory structures. Public oversight is also the basis for guaranteeing audit quality 
and regaining the trust of the public into the audit profession. 
 
The remaining part of this master thesis is structured in the following way. The second 
chapter will develop the frame of reference that consists of the anticipating crises theory, 
institutional theory, travel of ideas theory, and theoretical aspects of the differing auditing 
cultures across nations. The third chapter will then describe the methodology understanding of 
this research in looking at the research approach, design and how data was collected as well as 
at research limitations and the data evaluation. Chapter four to seven comprise of the 
empirical part of this thesis whereas chapter four will start off by providing background 
information necessary for the understanding of the research subject and the other chapters will 
present the empirical data that have been gathered to answer the three research questions. The 
eighth chapter will then in turn present an analysis of the empirical data and the theoretical 
models introduced in chapter two. Finally, the sixth chapter will not only conclude the 
theoretical and empirical findings of this thesis but also give a future perspective to the 
problematic of changing audit regulations and its impact on the national implementation in 
Member States. In addition, you can find the translated question guide I have used for my 
telephone interview in the appendix of this paper. 
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2. Chapter Two: Frame of reference 
This chapter will start off by shortly explaining the main aspects of the statutory audit process 
by presenting the financial reporting supply chain. The following subchapters will then focus 
on what theoretical concepts are applicable to analyse how audit regulation is changed in the 
EU.  
The 'anticipating crisis theory' will firstly illustrate the links between expectations and 
enactments in the relevant audit environments as both are important components for 
legislators and regulators when dealing with a crisis situation in the economic world. 
'Institutional theory' will then help to explain how audit regulators in the EU deal with 
different pressures when aiming for a harmonised market environment. The theoretical 
concept of 'Travel of ideas' will in addition help to explain how new concepts, or in this case 
audit regulations, can be differently interpreted on different levels. Audit regulations are all 
issued on the European level but provide in most cases only a framework for national 
legislators of how to implement the issued requirements. Member States can thus choose the 
form and methods of how to implement the EU regulations. And that means, the initial idea 
on the EU level might be differently (but within limits) interpreted on the Member State level. 
Lastly, the concept of 'auditing culture' will help to analyse why certain legislators and 
regulators act the way they do. The term 'culture' is however not used here in the traditional 
sense (describing values, behaviours etc.) but aims to illustrate how the regulatory system in 
the field of auditing varies between nations. 
 
Auditing has the functions to ensure that organizations firstly operate with integrity, 
accountability and a true and fair view, and secondly, act in the interests of all their 
stakeholders and the public in general. In order to guarantee that statutory auditors fulfil these 
responsibilities, regulatory bodies have to set efficient guidance mechanisms. The financial 
reporting supply chain, which is illustrated in diagram 1, can for that purpose help to explain 
how auditors and regulators are linked with each other. 
Preparers on the left side are responsible for the provision of financial statements and reports 
on internal control that are in compliance with general standards, like rules on corporate 
governance and IFRS. Statutory auditors are thereby required to audit these financial 
statements in compliance with international standards on audit but are at the same time 
monitored by a public oversight body in regard to their quality, integrity and value. That 
means the aim of preparers is to produce financial records for their investors and of auditors 
to verify them.  
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Enforcement authorities and financial specialists have however also an influence on the work 
of auditors. The first one can force auditors to adapt to new rules and regulations, e.g. to 
change working practices. It is however important to clarify what of the following 
enforcement levels the authorities are part of: the international, European, or national level. If 
an auditing firm has not complied with the rules set by the enforcement authority, this could 
be transferred to the respective Courts of Justice. 
Financial specialists can in contrast influence the presentation of the auditing work by their 
way of analysing the verified financial statements. Investors are in most cases no financial 
experts, i.e. they trust the analyses of specialists or take their opinions into account. 
In summary it can be said that the financial reporting supply chain illustrates the process of 
how financial records are produced, verified and published and what other factors influence 
this process. 
 
Diagram 1: The Financial Reporting Supply Chain 
 
adapted from Danjou, 2006, p.30 
 
 
2.1 Anticipating crises theory 
The emergence of crises is a common part of the economic world as downturns and recoveries 
are essential for a healthy economic cycle. But what is considered to be a crisis? There are 
many different views of how to define it. The most traditional one describes a crisis as a 
specific event that symbolizes a threat during a limited timeframe and thus requires a quick 
response in order to control and reduce the possible damage. A threat in turn is seen as an 
external force that harms an organization's products, reputation, and markets. Managers 
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should therefore implement post-crisis information publication and strategies to recover the 
damage. (Seeger et al., 2001) 
The more current definitions of a crisis describe the event in contrast as a natural phase of an 
organization's life cycle. It is a holistic point of view that looks upon the two parts: crisis and 
daily business, as well as collapse and recovery as basis for an organization. That means that a 
crisis is not only a threat but can also be seen as an opportunity for future development. 
Managers are thus meant to participate in that specific crisis by monitoring, assessing, 
communicating and planning the whole process. (Seeger at al., 2001) As a consequence, 
organizations do not only use post-crisis management but also ex-ante crisis prevention. 
Moreover, it is important to deal with a crisis pro-actively because measures implemented 
make possible consequences easier to handle, and the anticipation of a potential crisis helps to 
prepare and analyse the environment better.  
 
The anticipatory model argues thereby that an effective crisis management is used for 
prevention as it is easier for an organization to deal with a crisis for which it is prepared for. 
(Olaniran and Williams, 2001) Trying to prevent a crisis from happening means thus to have 
preparatory practices in place that will help the management to reduce uncertainties. Olaniran 
and Williams (2001:489) state: "the less attention devoted to understanding the nature of a 
crisis, the more likely the crisis will escalate." Consequently, decision makers need to 
understand the circumstances of a crisis happening and deal with them through a post-crisis 
action plan. Another factor is the behaviour of human beings. No theoretical model can 
account for any human action. Thus, human errors should be considered in an effective crisis 
management.  
As a result of these interpretations, it becomes obvious that Olaniran and Williams were 
looking at a model that explains how business should anticipate a crisis. I will however use 
the anticipatory model to analyse the regulatory system in the auditing profession. Regulators 
and legislators also need to anticipate critical situations, whether in form of a financial scandal 
or an economic crisis. It is especially important for them to understand the different 
expectations which are involved before developing the appropriate actions to deal with a 
crisis. Therefore, I have decided to use Olaniran and Williams's business model to explain the 
changing audit regulatory system within the EU. 
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In order to fully understand the anticipatory model, illustrated by the following diagram, it is 
however important to firstly define the two components of expectations and enactments. 
(Olaniran and Williams, 2001) 
 
Diagram 2: Anticipatory model 
 
Adoption of the anticipatory model from Olaniran and Williams (2001: p.491) 
 
Expectations on the one hand describe the assumptions people make about a specific 
situation. Assumptions in turn identify whether an error will have a dimension of a crisis or of 
a catastrophe. Decision-makers then have to deal with the environment of the potential crisis 
and set actions in motions that correspond with their assumptions. In view of the audit 
regulatory system in the EU, people have different expectations of the respective legislators 
and regulators and that has to be taken in consideration by them when dealing with a potential 
crisis environment.  
Enactment on the other hand can be explained in the way that anticipating a crisis will 
determine the actions a decision-maker will undertake to deal with that situation and these are 
dependent on the derived information. The reason for that lies in the fact that decision-makers 
have to anticipate opportunities, strengths, threats and weaknesses of the appropriate 
environments and then decide what measures are appropriate to preserve their interests. That 
means, legislators and regulators have to evaluate the audit environment before developing 
measures that preserves their initial goal to harmonise the audit market. 
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In sum, expectations and enactment both constitute the crisis anticipation process in which 
firstly the emergence of a crisis is predicted and secondly actions taken to decrease or even 
eliminate the extent of the whole situation. (Olaniran and Williams, 2001) 
 
An effective crisis management should moreover be vigilant to the relevant internal and 
external audit environments. Anticipating a crisis always involves looking for the triggering 
event that is defined by a specific place, time and agent. It represents the signal for the starting 
point of a catastrophic disaster. Consequently, decision-makers try to reduce the effects of the 
occurring crisis but will at the same time increase the stress-level. It is thus an essential part of 
the anticipatory model to focus on the two key elements of rigidity and control in order to 
facilitate a stress-free environment and enable the decision-makers to respond to the occurring 
crisis in the best possible way. 
Rigidity can be seen as the degree of inflexibility in regard to the actions that are publicly 
taken to deal with a certain situation. Furthermore, the quality of these actions is determined 
by how the decision-maker looks at the problem. Justifications are thereby essential to clarify 
how and why certain steps were taken in a crisis situation and also to avoid confusion and 
ambiguity. (Olaniran and Williams, 2001) 
Control can in contrast be seen as the influence of decision-makers to change a certain crisis 
situation. Ability and authority are thereby important elements that are linked to 
empowerment and thus facilitate a vigilant response of the decision-makers. Giving 
individuals or groups control enables a quicker respond to crisis-triggering events that might 
be caused by either internal failures or external circumstances that are of political or economic 
nature. It is therefore essential to establish a crisis management that considers both internal 
and external factors. (ibid) 
 
Recapitulating, the anticipatory model provides a pro-active view of crisis management. The 
actions of decision-makers are thereby dependent on the three components: expectations, 
enactments and the relevant environments. Hence, the anticipatory model helps to prepare and 
analyse for an potential crisis, which is here a crisis in audit regulation. 
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2.2 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory as part of the New Institutional Sociology describes how organizations 
behave while being under the pressure of the wider society. Organizations will always seek 
for external legitimacy by adhering to rules and norms. Their reason lies in the wishful 
compliance with what the society and certain institutions consider as values. Consequences 
are similar adoption processes which are also called 'institutional isomorphism'.  Isomorphism 
can thereby be explained as "a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to 
resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions". (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983:149) That means isomorphism is not just restricted to businesses but to a unit in 
a population. And that could in turn be interpreted as the auditing profession and its 
regulatory system. Regulators are dependent on constraining processes that could come from 
governments, international standard setters or other professional institutions and thus be 
forced to change their regulatory system.  
 
There are two main forms of isomorphism (competitive and institutional) that can influence a 
unit in a population. Competitive isomorphism describes the power of competitive forces and 
institutional isomorphism the political power and wish for institutional legitimacy. For the 
purpose of this master thesis, I will only focus on institutional isomorphism as that helps to 
firstly understand the influence of politics and ceremonies a specific unit of a population is 
surrounded with and secondly explains why certain units seek for an increasing legitimacy. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have identified three mechanisms in that context that make 
organizations change and become more alike: coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism. 
Coercive isomorphism describes thereby pressure from formal and informal sources on an 
organization to change. These sources might come from other organizations, cultural 
expectations or from governments. The pressure does not necessarily have to be a force but 
could also be a persuasion or an invitation. Organizations might become more alike due to 
changing regulation or due to specific societal preferences. DiMaggio and Powell argue 
however that these changes are rather ceremonial but that organizations are continuously 
aware of the preferences of the society. And that in turn helps them to obtain more power and 
influence. In the case of the audit regulatory system, regulators feel the pressure from 
coercive sources, like the European Commission and as a consequence adapt their national 
audit system to these pressures.  
Mimetic isomorphism describes that organizations might also change or imitate others due to 
the factor of uncertainty. Ambiguous goals, unclear technologies and uncertain environments 
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encourage organizations to model other organizations in their field. The term 'modelling' is 
thereby one response to uncertainty. Some organizations might be aware of it, others might 
not. Modelling can be seen as borrowing practices and is diffused by employees, 
consultancies or industry trade associations. DiMaggio and Powell claim that most 
organizational structures are homogenous because there are not so many different models 
existent in reality. Thus, in order to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity organizations tend to 
choose similar structures.  
Normative isomorphism in contrast explains pressures that come from professionalization. It 
is the "collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods 
of their work, to control "the production of producers", and to establish a cognitive base and 
legitimation for their occupational autonomy". (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983:152) Professionals 
can not only follow their own norms but must compromise with the ones from non-
professionals or regulators. When looking at the auditing profession, normative pressures 
arise from professionals and thus force audit regulation to be revised. There is a collective 
struggle of European regulators to establish an effective framework and to define appropriate 
measures. Another aspect is that professional power does not only come from inside the 
profession but is also assigned by the government. Sources for normative isomorphism are 
thereby based on firstly the cognition of education and legitimation by university specialists 
and secondly the diffusion of new models via professional networks. Universities can be seen 
as knowledge centres that have an influence on the development of norms and values. And 
with the help of these established norms, professionals can be made comparable.  
 
Summarizing, institutional theory describes that organizations or units of a population are 
forced to change over time. These environmental pressures can arrive from different sources 
but consequently all emphasize on the role of conformity and convention.  
 
 
2.3 Travel of ideas 
Organizations change over time, whether through the use of different business practice 
patterns or through changing visions of the management for their business future. The 
consequence is then a planned innovation or environmental adaption which can be described 
with the help of certain theoretical approaches. Planned innovation on the one hand involves 
strategic considerations, whereas an environmental adaption on the other hand involves 
contingency and institutional theories. 
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The whole phenomenon is analysed by Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) through their 
understanding of the travel of ideas: starting with an idea and ending with its translation into 
actions. I will use this understanding to show how the idea of a new audit regulation travels 
from the EU to the Member State (i.e. Germany in this case) level. Developed, proposed or 
issued legal measures of the EU have to be implemented into national legislation. These 
measures are however not precisely defined, meaning that Germany for instance has some 
kind of freedom in what way it implements the requirements. Thus, the new idea on the EU 
level travels to the national legislators and regulators level which is then in turn translated into 
actions that are appropriate for the situation. 
 
Ideas are powerful instruments that become true after their successful translation but 
consequently also lead to changes in their environment. They are "images which become 
known in the form of pictures of sounds" (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996:20) and then will 
be transformed into objects. That in turn will lead to further changes because firstly there will 
always appear some unknown objects, secondly known objects might change the outcome 
more than expected, and thirdly used working practices might also be altered. 
Applying ideas can thereby only be done via communication and are either of political nature, 
an imitation wish, subordination or to follow others. No matter what reason is behind forming 
and translating a new idea, the two factors of time and space are of crucial importance. 
According to Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) ideas always travel from a problematic to a 
more satisfied environment. The impulse comes however from people, "whether we see them 
as users or creators, who energize an idea any time they translated it for their own or 
somebody else's use" (ibid:23). This so-called translating model explains that ideas emerge in 
order to resolve an existent problem / crisis or to create new possibilities for a stagnated 
situation. Some ideas will thereby become fashionable and be translated and others will just 
stay at the local level. All the important features of an idea as well as the attributes of the 
respective problem are either created, negotiated or enforced throughout the translating 
process. 
Another notion of ideas is that people can only perceive something that they already know or 
that is somehow connected with a known issue. Meaning people "cannot translate what is 
wholly unrecognizable" (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996:28). It is however a fact that people 
always choose something that has a purpose for them. For instance, a regulator in a booming 
economy in the EU focuses on ideas that either help to enhance the harmonised audit market 
or lead to further actions. Whereas a regulator in a crisis-driven economy looks for an idea to 
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overcome the obstacles and to regain the trust of investors into the capital market again. Thus, 
it all depends on the purpose and what people make out of it. 
Sometimes a confirmation of the initial notion can be reached, and in other times the initial 
beliefs and purposes are re-arranged and then create new ideas as well as new market players. 
Moreover, an idea or initial notion can only catch on after existing in people's minds for some 
time. That means being a part of a master plan in a translocal space and time. The advantage 
of a master plan is hence the taken-for-granted attribute that allows the user to apply it in all 
possible situations. Some regulators tend to form collectives that allow them to interact, 
enhance international structures, provide an exchange of information, and to develop a group 
awareness. External forces, like the economic situation, political influence or professional 
networks, are thereby influencing the structure of these collectives. According to Czarniawska 
and Joergen (1983) collectives continuously look for new ideas which then could achieve an  
institutional status. However, fashion is an important feature as it causes a variety of different 
ideas. Regulators try them out, and either create a new fashion or establish institutions by 
applying certain working practices, continuing to use previous fashions or by launching the 
newest fashion as their final solution. For instance, American regulators might develop a new 
fashion that European regulators can then decide to copy or instead to develop a counter-
fashion that is more suitable for them. 
 
In order to get an idea enacted, it has to be objectified at a certain time and space, translated 
into a global setting and ultimately to be debated about the means by which it travels. 
That means ideas have to be made into action. In most cases, action takes place because it is 
like a routine and not because people remember the initial notion of it. Nevertheless, all 
actions need to be legitimized. In order to accomplish a simple action, many ideas are needed 
that not only serve the goal to translate the specific action but that will also produce counter-
ideas. (ibid) 
Another reason why ideas need to be objectified is that it is easier to make them of public 
knowledge. Political agents, contingent events and fashion notions are thereby supporting the 
process of ideas travelling from local places to translocal time and space ones. 
 
Recapitulating, ideas travel through time and space. They become objectified at the level they 
emerge and then travel towards a more global time and space where they will be translated 
into actions. It is however the question by which means they travel and be put into actions. 
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2.4 Auditing culture 
Standard setters, regulators, auditors, and companies all try to promote the ongoing 
improvements of financial reporting. It is however challenging for these parties as not only 
regulatory frameworks for auditing across countries vary but also traditions and rules on 
statutory books. (Holmquist2, 2008) 
Thus, pressures arrive from cultural practices and then contribute to the changes in auditing 
practices and regulations.  
 
The first pressure is the culture of governance. It "relates to the effectiveness of regulatory 
initiatives to penetrate the organization and ensure compliance with rules via specifically 
designated officers, audit committees, and other internal representatives". (Power, 1999:41) In 
addition, it describes intra-organizational issues related to control and motivation because 
working practices have to be made more sensitive to stakeholders. And that in turn requires an 
ongoing alertness and improvement. (ibid) 
 
The second pressure is concerned with the regulatory culture in a country itself. There are 
different traditions whether a regulator is taking a proactive stance when dealing with annual 
reports or not. The American statutory authority on the one hand has a great decision-making 
power and strong opinions on accounting matters. That means the responsible regulatory body 
SEC can be seen as oppressive. (Zeff, 2007) The German statutory authority on the other hand 
is influenced by political and academic debates for certain issues and thus, does not have such 
a great deal of oppressive power than the USA. It requires a more institutionalised lobbying 
process but is still powerful in enforcing its rules and regulations. (Evans and Honold, 2007) 
Another factor influencing the regulatory culture in a country is the degree of regulation 
issued. Some countries have strong and forceful regulators, i.e. companies are less willing to 
use international financial reporting standards because their national regulators would object 
plus insist upon changing the annual reports again. Other countries have softer regulators. 
That means companies are more willing to implement international financial reporting 
standards because their national regulators would not disagree but rather support the use of 
them. Lastly, the regulatory culture differs in countries following Civil Code or Common 
Law. The Civil Code is mostly applied in non-English-speaking countries, like Germany, 
France and Italy. That means the respective regulators find it more difficult to change the 
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 Jörgen Holmquist is the Director-General of the Internal Market and Services at the European Commission 
since 2007. 
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statement of the annual reports after the approval by the company's shareholders. It would 
rather have to wait until the next shareholders meeting or go to the Civil Court. Common Law 
regulators, like the USA and Great Britain, have however less difficulties to get a restatement 
as the respective regulators have the powers to simply construct the respective company to do 
so. Shareholders do not vote for the approval of the annual reports and thus do not have any 
decision-making power in this matter. (Zeff, 2007) 
It is however to mention that factors influencing the strength of any regulator symbolize at the 
same time the authority issued by national legislators to their responsible regulators as well as 
the issue whether the respective country follows Common Law or Civil Code. (ibid) 
 
The last pressure that contributes to changes in the auditing practices and regulations is the 
issue of comparability. Uniformity or flexibility in auditing are thereby two approaches 
legislators have to choose from. Stephen A. Zeff (2007:294) raises the question: "Does the 
same method to be used by all companies around the world produces 'genuine' comparability 
or 'superficial' comparability?" It is a fact that auditing varies among countries. National 
auditing practices are dependent on the mentality of people, the auditing culture itself as well 
as the historic influence of governmental bodies. Auditing and assurance standards are 
initially issued by a single international body but each country has its own influence on its 
national auditing standards. Comparability is thus an important issue for the EU when making 
the effort to establish a common auditing market. Some people believe that comparability can 
be achieved by standardised and uniform accounting methods, but others believe that 
comparability can only be obtained to the degree that national circumstances are still taken 
into consideration. (Zeff, 2007) It is thus the question to what extent it is really possible to 
establish a common European or even global market with comparable auditing practices and 
regulations. 
 
 
2.5 Summary 
The theoretical frame of reference has introduced several different theories that are relevant 
for analysing the changing audit regulations in the EU. Understanding statutory audit and its 
influencing factors is thereby the basis for this research. The introduced anticipatory model 
will further enable me to put changes of audit regulations in the context of a crisis situation 
and therewith allow me to look at what regulators and legislators have to deal with. 
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Institutional isomorphism as well as the travel of idea theory have then introduced other 
aspects that can be used for explaining how audit regulation change in the EU. It is thereby 
important to distinguish between the EU and the Member State level as new ideas in the 
auditing field travel from the higher to the lower level.  
Nonetheless, it is also necessary to understand the auditing culture when looking at the 
regulatory systems of the EU Member States. They differ across borders and thus, represent a 
crucial factor of how auditing regulation can be changed. That means that in order to fully 
understand how audit regulation changes in the EU and what impacts that might have on the 
implementation process in the Member State, it is important to acknowledge the different 
auditing cultures and to integrate that in the analysis. 
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3. Chapter Three: Methodology 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the overall approach of researching the problem 
statement and three research questions formulated in the first section. In that process, I will 
look upon the design, execution and evaluation of the research results as well as upon the 
tools and approaches used in this master thesis. Before looking at these details it is however 
important to understand what the term 'methodology' means and what philosophical 
positioning I will hold to justify my analysis of the empirical data.  
 
 
3.1 What is methodology? 
Researchers have to combine social science and philosophy in order to analyse and interpret 
their empirical data in a proper way. Theoretical and philosophical assumptions that are 
concerned with ontology, epistemology and methodology are thereby a useful bridge to link 
these two areas. (Hopper and Powell, 1985) Moreover, it is important to have a good 
understanding of philosophical issues because that will help the researcher to firstly clarify 
his/her research design, secondly help to find the appropriate design and thirdly identify the 
research designs that are not useful for his/her work. The three philosophical assumptions of 
ontology, epistemology and methodology are thus essential to fully understand the 
comprehension of the researcher. (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008)  
Ontology as the starting point looks at the nature of reality, i.e. it provides a description of the 
facts of reality. It has furthermore two extremes (representationalism and nominalism) that are 
on the one side looking at the social world as being independent, empirical and external from 
the cognition of the individual, and on the opposite side depending on the individual's 
consciousness. (Hopper and Powell, 2007) 
Epistemology inquires into the nature of knowledge, i.e. it explores how truth and belief can 
be justified. Its two extremes positivism and social constructionism describe on the one side 
the belief that knowledge can be obtained through observation and on the opposite side the 
belief that knowledge is more personal and thus can only be obtained by investigating the 
respective subject. (ibid) 
Methodology as the final point of this chapter describes the methods and tools used to gain 
knowledge, i.e. it provides an understanding of how empirical data is collected and analysed. 
It refers to the choices the researcher will make when studying a specific phenomenon 
(Silverman, 2007) If the social world is thereby seen as being independent and external, then 
quantitative methods are used to help explaining social patterns and regularities. If the social 
Chapter Three: Methodology 18 
world is however seen as being dependent on subjective experiences, then qualitative methods 
are used to provide an insight into the world of the subject to be researched. (Hopper and 
Powell, 2007) 
Researchers thus have to firstly position themselves in what way they want to investigate their 
chosen subject and secondly provide a sound methodology. (Riley et al., 2007) In the case of 
this master thesis, I want to look at the research topic from the social constructionist point of 
view. It is however challenging to do so when mainly concentrating on a documentary data 
collection basis because I will not be able to obtain first-hand knowledge myself but will have 
to trust the opinions and interpretations of the chosen authors instead. My goal is thus to 
investigate the relationship between auditing regulations and the phenomenon of crisis and to 
get data through the experiences of the participants and their environment. It is important to 
understand exactly how the audit regulatory system works in the EU as well as in Germany as 
my case study. The viewpoints of legislators, regulators and analysts will thereby provide me 
with empirical data that enables me to analyse the problem statement in a better way. My 
philosophical positioning will further allow me to look at how audit regulations change over 
time as the insights from those groups will allow me to not only look at historical and present 
events but to also make subjective assumptions and interpretations that could be used as 
future outlook.  
 
 
3.2 Research approach 
Before going into more detail about the specific research design, it is important to describe the 
main concepts used in this master thesis. Every researcher has to define how he/she will 
organise the research activities and what sources and methods will be used during the process 
of gathering data. It is also essential for the research approach to be in line with the 
philosophical positioning of the researcher because a clear strategy facilitates to deal with 
every aspect of the research and also in regard to the changing context throughout the whole 
process. (Mason, 2004)  
I have thus chosen to do a deductive research as a tool to applying the relevant theories in this 
master thesis. That means relevant theories will lead to firstly the formulation of a hypothesis, 
secondly to the collection of empirical data and lastly to the testing of that hypothesis. The 
goal of the researchers is thereby to derive some explanations for the observed behaviour of 
the specific research topic. (Riley et al., 2007) That whole process is also seen as moving 
from the more general to the more specific and concrete view. (Punch, 2005) Deductive 
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reasoning is thereby mainly concerned with testing and confirming the initial formulated 
theories which means that it requires sufficient empirical data to verify or falsify them.  
The choice of sources and methods is thereby essential for a successful research strategy. This 
master thesis will focus on using only qualitative sources for gathering data as that is 
fundamental for understanding how the research subject of auditing regulations has been 
changed in the EU and how that has ultimately changed the German regulatory system. That 
means that theories concerning the governance on the EU and Germany level as well as the 
subjective opinion of the interviewee – both written and orally expressed – are necessary to 
investigate this research topic. With the help of these methods, I will be able to apply the 
theories of chapter two and to analyse them in regard to my problem statement. 
 
The next subchapter will then give a more narrow description of the research design in regard 
to specifying methods and procedures in order to collect the needed information for this 
master thesis. 
 
 
3.3 Research design 
The main factors influencing the design of a research project are the chosen topic and how 
much empirical data is available for collection. In the case of this master thesis, I have chosen 
to investigate the relationship of the audit regulatory system between the EU and Germany 
under the assumption of an influence of crises. Thereafter, I have formulized a problem 
statement and three research questions in order to collect the essential information necessary 
to analyse this topic. The scientific design used for this research subject will consist of a 
mixture of descriptions and explorations.  
Descriptive design on the one hand is based upon information and analyses questions that are 
concerned with the What, When, Where and Who of a chosen research topic. The goal of 
descriptive research is thus to establish a picture of the research object by collecting as much 
empirical data as possible. (Riley et al., 2007) Explorative design on the other hand goes 
beyond just describing a picture by investigating something new or something that is not very 
well known so far. The main goal is thereby to prepare the research for further studies or to 
develop methods that can be used in other studies. (Silverman, 2007) Descriptive knowledge 
is a first step to understanding phenomena but only with the help of explorative methods can 
something new be found or be better understood. (Punch, 2005) In addition, implementing a 
mixed design of description and exploration will give the research a flexibility to adapt 
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questions and methods to whatever has been explored during the investigation process. Thus, 
I will use the combination of both designs in order to firstly draw a picture of the situation of 
the audit regulatory systems within the EU and to secondly explore how much influence the 
European Commission has on the implementation of audit regulations in Member States. It is 
essential for this research to start off describing the regulatory system on the EU level as well 
as on the German level before exploring why and how audit regulations change. The audit 
regulatory system is quite complicated and so far not well known to outsiders. The description 
will therefore provide a basis for the reader to comprehend the explorative part of the thesis. 
 
In order to collect the information that is necessary to investigate this research problem, I 
have furthermore chosen to concentrate on qualitative instead of on quantitative research. 
There are many occasions where researchers do not want to quantify social phenomena or 
interaction. Instead they want to explain intangible factors like values, perceptions and 
feelings that will help to understand human behaviour. According to Riley et al. (2007, p.99) 
qualitative research 'seeks to describe, decode and translate … the meaning … of certain more 
or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world' and is not looking on how often 
that specific phenomenon has happened.  
Qualitative data is also not restricted to formal, fixed rules but consists of a variety of things. 
Examples are interview transcripts, documents, observational records and notes, audiovisual 
materials or personal experience notes like artefacts, journals and narratives. Due to this wide 
range of possibilities, qualitative researchers usually do not restrict themselves to only one 
data collection method. They use multiple data sources because the more data is collected 
from different sources, the more valid and reliable the research will be seen as. It is without 
any question more difficult for qualitative researchers to decrease the danger of human error 
and bias but only observations and interviews can provide the necessary insight into human 
behaviour. (Punch, 2005) The method of a case study is another technique how to combine 
various qualitative data sources, in most cases from documents, personal experience and 
interviews. It "aims to understand the case in depth, and its natural setting, recognizing its 
complexity and its context. It also has a holistic focus, aiming to preserve and understand the 
wholeness and unity of the case". (Punch, 2005:144) There are three different types of case 
studies: intrinsic, instrumental and collective. The two first ones are single case studies 
whereas the third type a multiple one is. An intrinsic case study is undertaken when a 
researcher wants to gain a better understanding of the particular case and does not attempt to 
generalize beyond it. An instrumental case study in contrast looks at a particular case in order 
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to get a better insight of an issue or to revise a generalization. The collective case study as last 
example is an extension of the instrumental case study that aims to look at general phenomena 
or population by covering several cases. (Silverman, 2007) 
This master thesis will be designed as an intrinsic case study with the main focus on official 
documents and supplementary with an interview with a representative of the German auditor 
oversight board. I have chosen this design because the official documents will provide me 
with a better understanding of the different audit regulatory systems in the EU and the single 
interview will reveal me with a more precise viewpoint from the German auditor oversight 
board. Germany as a major representative of the EU will furthermore give me the opportunity 
to investigate the explicit impacts of European audit regulations onto the German regulatory 
system and therewith be able to analyse how regulations change in the EU. 
 
The following subchapter will then describe more precisely how I have collected the 
qualitative data that are necessary to make a valid and reliable analysis of the problem 
statement. 
 
 
3.4 Data collection methods 
As stated in the previous sub-chapters, qualitative methods seem to be more applicable for 
researching the changes of audit regulations in the EU than quantitative methods. In order to 
find answers to this research problem, an understanding of the environment, attitudes, 
perceptions and opinions of the subject involved is necessary. In regard to Punch (2005:141), 
qualitative methods are naturalistic by studying people, things and events in their natural 
settings.   
There is however no best way on how to conduct a qualitative research. In most cases, 
research questions will be changed more than once during the whole process of the research 
work due to the outcomes from interviews or information found in documents. (Punch, 2005) 
It is thus important to describe the different data collection methods used within a research 
project. 
 
The basis of qualitative research consists thereby of primary and secondary data which can 
furthermore be divided into various techniques, like interviews, observation, experiences, 
documents and so on. Primary data is the collection of new and original information whereas 
secondary data consists of the collection of existing sources, like books, reports from 
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governments, or documents. (Riley et al., 2007) Examples for primary data could be 
interviews, personal experiences or action research, and are directly collected by the 
respective researcher. They are usually used for a specific case study or comparative studies 
because first-hand experiences provide the researcher with empirical data from the real world 
and thus make the work more reliable and valid. 
Secondary data in contrast can come from different sources which are either of academic or 
non-academic, or either of quantitative or qualitative nature. It is however more challenging to 
establish the quality in secondary data as it has come as a result of other research. Important 
characteristics are thus credentials, objectivity and justification. (Riley et al., 2007) 
 
For the purpose of this master thesis, I have chosen to mainly do a documentary research as 
secondary data collection method and in addition, gain supplement information through a 
telephone interview as primary data collection method. 
I have gathered the main empirical data from a documentary research in books, articles and 
electronic web pages because researching the audit regulatory system of the EU and of 
Germany requires a richness of historical and current data that are only provided by the 
respective legislators and regulators. A main feature of our society is to keep documentary 
evidence of events and developments (Punch, 2005), thus, it is important for me to collect 
those information that are relevant for my study. I have chosen to use documents that come 
from governmental pages of the EU and Germany because they provide me with the highest 
possible level of reliable and trustworthy information for the type of secondary data. In 
addition, I have gathered data from well-known analysts within the European audit profession 
and used speeches / recommendations from representatives of international recognised 
auditing bodies, like the Financial Stability Forum, the EGAOB and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales. The electronic web has thereby supported my research by 
using keywords like 'auditor oversight', 'crisis regulation', 'Statutory Audit Directive' and so 
on. 
In order to supplement the information gathered through the documentary research, I have 
chosen to conduct an interview with Prof. Dr. Marten3 as a representative of the German 
auditor oversight board via telephone. Initially, I had planned to conduct more interviews with 
German auditors and another representative of the German regulatory system but due to time, 
location and circumstances limitations, I was not able to do so. Consequently, I have chosen 
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 Prof. Dr. Kai-Uwe Marten is a professor at the university of Ulm since 2003 and has his research interests in 
the auditing field with focus on public oversight and quality assurance. He is furthermore the vice-chairman of 
the APAK since 2005 and is associated with the EGAOB. 
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to only conduct one telephone interview with the relatively new-established auditor oversight 
committee in Germany. That means gathering data from an independent body and therewith, 
get first-hand information about the implementation process of the SAD in Germany. These 
data will further on help me to analyse the relationship between the EU and the German audit 
regulatory system in a better way. The telephone interview was thereby semi-structured, i.e. 
an interview guide with several questions (attached in the appendix) was sent to the 
interviewee in advance but got changed during the overall duration of the conversation. The 
content of the answers has thus determined the course of the interview. The method of an 
interview – whether face-to-face or via telephone – has the advantage to firstly show me what 
meanings, feelings and values the interviewee has about the respective research topic and to 
secondly make me understand how the interviewee constructs the reality of the chosen topic, 
i.e. what constitutes as reality for the interviewee. That also means subjectivity plays an 
essential part. In order to tackle this problem, I have not only recorded the telephone interview 
but also transcribed it afterwards. Written word is easier to analyse because it gives me the 
opportunity to get a better grip on the subjectivity and thus enables me to use it in the right 
way. As last stage, I have sent the transcribed telephone interview back to the interviewee for 
confirmation. It has to be mentioned here that my telephone interview was conducted in 
German, i.e. any quotations used in the empirical and analysis chapters as well as the attached 
interview guide are translated into English by me.  
 
 
3.5 Methodological limitations 
This master thesis has been limited in regard to the number of interviews, the data reliability 
and in regard to the collection methods used. 
I have chosen to only use one interview with a representative of the German auditor oversight 
commission (APAK) due to a lack of time, different locations and circumstances. Germany is 
preoccupied with the implications of the contemporary financial crisis as well as with the 
introduction of the new amendments of the German Commercial Code and thus, potential 
interviewees did not have time to answer questions within the timeframe of this master thesis. 
Nonetheless, the interview with Prof. Dr. Marten has not only provided me with essential 
information about the German audit regulatory system but also reflected a fairly unbiased 
point of view as the APAK is an independent body that consists of non-auditors. 
In regard to data reliability, there are of course some methodological limitations that arise 
during the process of an interview. A high subjectivity and biased opinions are the most likely 
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scenarios. I have however chosen Prof. Dr. Marten as my interviewee because he does not 
work as an auditor. Instead, he works more like an external consultant to the APAK and thus 
diminishes the danger of being too subjective. It is also difficult to generalize for only having 
conducted one interview. Generalization can be described as external validity, i.e. whether the 
theories and analyses found in this research work are relevant to other institutions or external 
parties. The main goal of this master thesis will thus be to understand the complexity and the 
context of my case study: the implementation of the SAD in Germany. I will not focus on 
generalizing my findings for other Member States of the EU but to build a valuable in-depth 
understanding of the German case. 
In regard to the collection methods, it is difficult to address all important aspects of the reality 
the interviewee is living in. Even though the telephone interview was semi-structured and 
there was time for the interviewee to address certain aspects, it is easy to overlook some of 
them. I have however supplemented this lack by sufficient secondary data.  
 
 
3.6 Data evaluation 
In order to demonstrate that this qualitative study is credible, the methods and sources used in 
this research have to be reliable and analyses and conclusions valid. Just because there has 
been no use of quantitative methods, does not mean that the quality, rigour and wider 
potential of this research is not scientific. (Mason, 2004) Every qualitative researcher should 
thus have a methodological awareness that "involves a commitment to showing as much as 
possible to the audience of research studies … the procedures and evidence that have led to 
particular conclusions, always open to the possibility that conclusions may need to be revised 
in the light of new evidence." (Silverman, 2007:209) That means the relevant terms are 
validity and reliability. 
 
 Validity 
This criterion is associated with showing that the researcher's implemented concept can be 
identified, observed or measured in the way he/her has stated in the research work. It is 
however more difficult to prove validity for qualitative researchers. One way of proving 
validity could thus be to use the method of triangulation which combines different ways of 
looking at a certain situation or finding. (Silverman, 2007) Thus, I have chosen to 
combine the method of a telephone interview with the method of gathering secondary data 
that are mostly derived from reliable and unbiased sources, like from legislators and 
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regulators. These two methods will help to make my research findings not only valid in its 
context but also valid for the external reader. 
 
 Reliability 
This criterion is associated with the accuracy of the methods and techniques employed in 
the research work. (Mason, 2004) Quantitative researchers would use tools like pre-
testing, cross-checking and scales for assuring the reliability of their data. Qualitative 
researchers in contrast have to rely on error-free, faithful and verifiable findings. 
(Silverman, 2007) They must therefore ensure that their data collection and interpretation 
are firstly in line with their research questions, and secondly thorough, honest and 
accurate. Qualitative researchers should not make up or misrepresent data, or be careless 
in the interpretation of their findings. (Mason, 2004) 
In order to show that my data is reliable and accurate, I have done an intense literature 
review prior to the telephone interview as well as collected written information 
concerning my problem statement and research questions. The interview itself has 
provided me with reliable and valid information as the APAK is independent from any 
governmental influence in Germany or the EU and thus represents the professional 
oversight of any German auditors. My own interpretations were based on these fairly 
unbiased empirical findings and thus decreased the danger of failing reliability.  
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4. Chapter Four: Background 
This chapter has the goal to provide the background information necessary for the reader to 
understand the research subject of this master thesis. The first part will give a short 
introduction to the history of financial scandals and economic crises whereas the second part 
will present an overview of the European auditing structure and explain what parties are 
legally responsible for changing audit regulations and what legal means they can use. 
 
 
4.1 Time of changes: Crises 1997-2002 
The increasing number of financial crises and capital market turmoil has made it more and 
more important to have effective audit regulations in place.  
The Asian financial crisis from 1997 to 1998 was the first important incident that triggered 
changes in the audit regulation. There were four basic problems: a shortage of foreign 
exchange in Asian countries, under-developed financial sectors as well as mechanisms to 
allocate capital, spill-over effects on the American market and on the rest of the world, and a 
reconsideration of the role of the International Monetary Fund. (Nanto, 1998) The 
consequences of this crisis were the development of a new international financial architecture, 
and the increasing importance of transparency in accounting and auditing practices. The SEC 
responded to this crisis by demanding more comparable, transparent and reliable information 
for investors in efficient capital markets. One result was then the establishment of the 
Financial Stability Forum in 1999 that enabled more accounting and auditing regulation but at 
the same time maintained the neo-liberalistic world order. The goal of this forum was in short 
to promote financial stability, to enhance cooperation between international authorities and to 
reduce the tendency for financial debacles to disseminate from one country to another. (FSF, 
2009a) 
 
Financial business debacles in the early years of the 21st century further reduced public 
confidence in external auditors and public listed auditing companies of the capital markets. 
The consequences were a credibility crisis and an overhaul of existing accounting and 
auditing regulations. Shareholder trust thus has to be restored as well as frameworks be 
revised, improved and made more effective. (Soltani, 2007) 
One of the most prominent incidents is the catastrophic business failure of Enron and its 
responsible auditing firm Arthur Andersen. Enron was one of the world's biggest energy 
companies that was named "America's Most Innovative Company" for several times. Its filing 
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for bankruptcy protection in 2001 stirred up the capital markets worldwide. The collapse led 
to a first revision of the duties of auditors, as well as to a close examination of the practices 
audit firms were using. Up to that point auditing firms could engage as consultant, external 
and internal auditor at the same time. The Enron case uncovered gaps in the existing 
accounting and auditing regulations. The managers of Enron for example had to readjust their 
income from 1997 by half its size as a consequence of the increasing pressure of the SEC. The 
responsible auditing firm Arthur Andersen however decided that these new adjustments of 
passed financial statements were not material and thus did not publish them. As a 
consequence, the 100-year-old auditing firms was banned from any auditing practices in the 
United States and sold most of its international operations as well. (Soltani, 2007) 
The auditing firm Arthur Andersen was responsible for the public to raise questions about the 
interpretations of sound auditing standards by individual auditors. The American auditing 
oversight body had consequently to react to these questions and growing mistrust by issuing a 
new law, called Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It symbolizes the most significant securities law reform 
since the Security Act came into being in 1933. The main tasks of the SOX were to increase 
requirements in regard to auditor's independence, to define ethical responsibilities of everyone 
involved in preparing and verifying financial statements, and to enhance disclosure 
requirements. Its most important measure was to introduce a new public oversight body called 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Body (PCAOB) which is responsible for overseeing 
the audits of public companies as well as the work of auditors themselves. It sets auditing 
standards, has the authority to perform inspections and has the power to bring in disciplinary 
actions against any public firms charged with violation of the rules set by the PCAOB or SEC. 
(Giles et al., 2004) In addition to that, the rules also apply to those foreign companies that are 
listed at the New York Stock Exchange or to foreign auditors working for American 
companies. It has thus extraterritorial spill-over effects on countries and their national 
oversight boards outside the USA. (Dewing and Russell, 2004a) 
The SOX has however failed to make any exemptions for foreign companies and their 
auditors that are not listed in the USA. The SEC responded to this shortcoming in issuing a 
new rule that allows reliance on other national oversight boards. The downside was though 
that the SEC used an evaluation system and basically only relied on other national oversight 
boards that were structured in the same way than its own. (Giles et al., 2004) 
Around the same time as the occurrence of the Enron scandal, major incidents also happened 
in the European Union and that made fast changes in the auditing and accounting structure 
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much more important. The business collapse of Parmalat (2004) had thereby probably the 
most far-reaching consequences on the European capital market in regard to auditor oversight. 
Parmalat was one of the largest and most successful companies in Italy that was producing 
dairy and food products. It was also a giant dairy supplier on the world market. By 2003 it 
became obvious that the company had borrowed money from various global banks by 
justifying these loans in inflating its annual revenues through fictitious sales to other retailers. 
Its responsible auditing firm did not discover that material fraud or choose to not disclose it. 
The consequence was that Parmalat's management was prosecuted for its financial statement 
misstatements and omissions under Italian jurisdiction. In addition, the Italian code of 
governance required the setting up of an internal audit committee consisting of three members 
that are partly non-executive directors of the respective company. Parmalat however had three 
executive directors in that committee that were not able to provide an objective assessment of 
internal control mechanisms. Another reason for the failure of Parmalat was that its external 
auditors did not discover the extensive fraudulent operations of the management. (Soltani, 
2007) The external auditors were however a problem on their own. In 1999, Parmalat had to 
change its auditing firm due to mandatory rotation law in Italy. It employed another one but 
kept the services of the old auditing firm for their offshore entities. That means Parmalat 
employed two auditing firms which both failed to discover the fraudulent operations of the 
management. 
Recapitulating, these two prime examples of business failure and misperception of the general 
public in the USA and the EU have revealed weak internal controls of the respective 
companies as well as flaws in the duties of auditors. Up to that point, auditing firms could 
work in fields that did not require full independency from their clients and also did not have to 
take over full responsibility for misstatements. That shows that national as well as 
international audit regulations were clearly not effective enough and did not cover all 
eventualities that might happen in the fast-changing business environment. As consequences 
of these corporate scandals, oversight bodies revised their regulatory framework and 
introduced stricter laws. The SEC implemented the SOX as their consequence of the Enron 
scandal and the EU rewrote the EU 8th Directive and required its members to implement these 
new regulations into national law by mid 2008. 
 
Looking back at these continuous appearances of financial scandals, it becomes obvious "that 
self-regulation of the audit profession is not an appropriate model anymore" (Holmquist, 
2008:3). The setting up of independent public oversight systems was seen as one way to 
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restore the trust into the audit market again. Cooperation is essential for its success, because 
only by relying on other Member States' oversight systems can the model of mutual 
cooperation work. Regulators and legislators thus should follow the example of multinational 
companies and their auditors and adapt to internationalisation. The crises had however 
highlighted that there was a lack of cooperation and coordination between the various 
Member State regulators and legislators. The goal of the Statutory Audit Directive is thus to 
eradicate this lack and provide a common framework every Member State has to implement 
and follow. (Holmquist, 2008)  
 
 
4.2 The general structure of the EU in the field of auditing 
In order to achieve a single European market, the regulatory environment needs to be 
improved. Businesses need to being able to operate in a European dimension as well as being 
competitive on the international scale. The harmonisation of the company law is thereby a 
first step. It aims to provide a simplified legal environment with less red tape. (EU, 2009) 
 
New legislation is proposed by the European Commission, but only the European Parliament 
and Council can pass the law. There are several ways on how the EU can achieve this object: 
either by a new treaty, international agreement, or by secondary legislation. The latter one is 
most important for internal market affairs, like the harmonisation of the European market. It 
comprises of legal binding instruments, such as regulations, directives, and decisions, and of 
non-binding instruments, such as recommendations and opinions. (EU law, 2009)  
The most powerful instrument is thereby a regulation as it is a general measure that is binding 
in all its parts. It becomes effective without passing the actual national legislation procedures. 
That means a regulation creates a law that has an immediate affect in all Member States. 
A directive, in contrast, is less powerful as it is aimed to all Member States and has to be 
incorporated in national law. Unlike a regulation, it however gives the Member State the 
freedom to decide upon the form and method of its adoption. If the directive is not translated 
into national law by the end of its deadline, it will be convicted by the respective national 
court. 
A decision, as last binding measure, is an instrument that the EU uses to rule on a certain 
matter. It is an individual measure directly addressed to a specific Member State or citizen of 
the EU and only counts for that occasion. It is not legally binding for all Member States. (EU 
law, 2009) 
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Other legal instruments often used in the auditing field are recommendations and opinions. A 
recommendation reflects a specific line of action and opinion of any European institution but 
without the legal obligation, whilst an opinion on the other hand is a way to express one's 
statement without any legal strings attached. (ibid)  
 
Legislative power in regard to the adoption of regulations and directives lies with both the 
European Parliament and the Council. (EU law, 2009) They are responsible to monitor the 
correct and timely transposition by all Member States or at the worst to penalise the incorrect 
or late implementation. Binding legal instruments force thereby Member States to achieve the 
specified results but are free in choosing the form and means of how to achieve them. If one 
member infringes this procedure, the Parliament and Council are allowed to take legal actions 
before the Court of Justice. That means potential sanctioning threats can lead to a relatively 
fast implementation. Yet, the EU aims to help the correct and timely transposition by 
providing additional assistance from the Commission to the Member States since 2002. In 
addition, a transposition scoreboard is frequently published that helps to inform and update all 
European citizens and businesses about the progress of the national implementations. (EU, 
2005)  
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5. Chapter Five: Why has the SAD been developed in the EU? 
This chapter will explore why the Statutory Audit Directive has been developed in the EU by 
presenting three subchapters that are according to specific timeframes. The first one will 
describe and analyse the changes of audit regulations in the EU between the 1984 issued EU 
8th Directive and the 2001/2002 Enron scandal. The second subchapter will look closer at the 
development of the SAD by starting with the Enron implications and ending with the issuance 
of the SAD in 2006. The last subchapter will then explore more specifically the actual 
implementation of the SAD after its issuance. 
 
 
5.1 Audit regulation changes before the Enron scandal 
The EU 8th Directive was first adopted in 1984 and was at the same time the first 
measurement of the European Union attempting to somehow unite the different auditing 
requirements of all its Member States by issuing common standards on statutory audit. It 
involved regulations towards the general scope of statutory auditing, the approval of auditors, 
professional integrity and independence, publicity, and final provisions. (EU, 1984) That 
means, the 8th Directive established common standards for the approval of statutory auditors 
in the scope of defining minimum conditions for their educational qualification and required 
experience level. (Dewing, 2004a) The directive did however not contain any precise 
specifications in regard to auditor's independence, a quality assurance system and the public 
oversight function which then consequently led to varying national legislation and 
professional rules throughout the following years. (Inwinkl et al., 2008) So contrary to the 
initial aim, the 8th Directive did not achieve to establish a completely harmonised auditing 
area in the European Union. (Soltani, 2007) 
  
The following diagram will thus help to see how audit regulation in the EU got changed as 
consequence of the dissatisfaction with the EU 8th Directive. 
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Diagram 3: EU audit regulations before Enron 
 
 
The first reaction of the European Commission to the dissatisfying EU 8th Directive was the 
publishment of a Green Paper in 1996 which defined the role, position and liability of 
statutory auditors. It furthermore suggested an approval of statutory auditors in the EU which 
goes beyond the scope of the EU 8th Directive. (EC, 2003a) 
These suggestions were then included into the EC Communication from 1998 about the 
statutory audit in the European Union. It firstly included the establishment of a Committee on 
Auditing with the purpose to enhance the cooperation between accounting firms and Member 
States. The Committee comprised of government experts by each Member State and 
representatives of the European accountancy profession. Its duties were a review of the 
external national quality assurance systems across the EU, an examination of auditor's 
independence and a review of the international standards on auditing. A second issue of the 
Communication was that auditing should be more connected with corporate governance, i.e. 
the position of an auditor within an organization should be strengthened. (Dewing and 
Russell, 2004a) 
The work of the Committee on Auditing led however to further EU actions: the 
Recommendation on quality assurance for the statutory auditor in November 2000 and the 
Recommendation on statutory auditor's independence in May 2002. Both require Member 
States to make a full implementation into their national auditing systems. The 2000 
Recommendation set out minimum standards for external quality assurance systems and had 
the aim to make every Member State adopt at least the minimum requirements for their 
quality assurance systems. The reason for that strong focus on quality assurance was that a 
Date Details EU response 
1984 common standards for statutory audit EU 8th Directive 
1996 role, position and liability of statutory  
auditors 
Green Paper 
1998 establishment of a committee on auditing; 
strengthened role of auditor; 
revised legislation not necessarily  
envisaged 
Communication 
2000 minimum standards for external quality 
systems for statutory audits 
Recommendation 
2002 fundamental principles; 
specific requirements on the independence 
of statutory auditors 
Recommendation 
2001 civil liability of statutory auditors Study 
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good audit quality is essential to satisfy the stakeholders of a company with its conform 
auditing standard performance. A downside of the recommendation was however that it did 
not impose common standards, e.g. different mechanisms for the public oversight function 
were allowed. As a consequence, the European Commission issued an improved version of 
this recommendation in 2008. (Dewing and Russell, 2001) Details to this recommendation 
can be found in the in chapter 5.3. The 2002 Recommendation is in contrast concerned with 
establishing common independence rules for statutory auditors. It defines specific 
requirements an auditor has to fulfil and therewith, provides guidance on how to apply the 
general rules in specific situations. (ibid) 
 
This long list of audit regulations before the emergence of the Enron scandal shows the 
attempt of the EU to improve the quality of auditing practices and to establish a common 
market. There were however also other events that influenced the work of the European 
Commission in this field. The most prominent one is the Financial Service Action Plan 
(FSAP) that has been introduced in 1999 and was scheduled to be implemented by 2005. It 
recognised "the central importance of financial reporting, statutory audit and corporate 
governance". (Dewing and Russell, 2004a:289) The overall goal was thus to harmonise the 
European market by launching several regulations in the earlier mentioned fields. 
International developments as well as an increasing globalization have moreover made a fast 
consolidation of EU financial markets more pressing. It was stated in the FSAP that 
increasing contagion effects will call for more cooperation at the international level between 
legislators and regulators. (Dewing and Russell, 2004a) 
 
 
5.2 Development of the SAD 
The steady improvement of audit quality and of establishing a harmonised market in Europe 
was however interrupted by the Enron scandal in 2001/2002. 
It revealed deficiencies of the American auditing system and ultimately led to criticism in 
regard to external quality assurance systems and auditor's independence, as well as to 
highlighting the ineffectiveness of the present oversight bodies and audit committees inside an 
organization. As a consequence, stakeholders from all over the world lost their confidence in 
the capital markets and international legislators and regulators had to find a way to restore 
their trust. The Americans responded to all this by issuing the SOX in 2002 and therewith 
introduced extraterritorial requirements for all in the USA listed companies as well as for 
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auditing firms engaged with the verification of annual statements of American firms. The 
initial response of the EU was in contrast issued shortly after the business collapses and 
before the passage of the SOX. It is summarized in a note for the informal Ecofin council 
meeting in April 2002 and describes three main international policy areas – financial 
reporting, statutory audit and corporate governance. The area statutory audit comprises 
thereby of strategies to improve external quality assurance, auditor independence and quality 
standards. (EC, 2002) 
The EU was consequently deeply concerned about the American imperialism for foreign 
organization and auditors but with the increasing communication between the European 
Commission and SEC, that concern diminished. Frits Bolkestein4 put it that way: "we believe 
the outcome has been quite positive … we feel many of our comments have been taken into 
account" (Dewing and Russell, 2004a:307) That does not mean all problems were solved but 
the extraterritorial requirements of the US triggered a faster response of the EU to deal with 
the after-effects of Enron and then consequently also with the Parmalat scandal. 
 
Diagram 5 thus presents a timeline of the issued audit regulations that were issued by the 
European Commission after the Enron scandal and finishes off with the introduction of the 
Statutory Audit Directive in 2006. 
 
Diagram 4: EU audit regulations after Enron 
 
The post-Enron EU response was mainly concerned with demonstrating a political 
determination to the American standard setters in improving the European accounting and 
auditing market. The result was thus the issuance of two Communications in 2003.  
                                                 
4
 Frits Bolkestein was the EU-Commissioner for the internal market from 1999-2004 and was then replaced by 
Charlie McCreevy. 
Date Details EU response 
2003 reinforcing statutory audit; 
modernizing company law; 
enhancing corporate governance; 
recognition of ISAs; 
establishment of Audit Regulatory 
Communication 
2006 clarifies the role and position of auditors; 
requirements for the audit infrastructure 
Statutory 
Audit Directive 
2002 application of IFRS; 
implementing of 3 statutory audit strategies; 
improvement of corporate governance 
Note 
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The first one identifies the new reinforced area of statutory audit by presenting a 10-point 
action plan with short-term and mid-term goals. The four short-term goals were on the one 
hand the modernisation of the EU 8th Directive, the improvement of the regulatory 
infrastructure within the EU, the recognition of the use of ISAs, and the strengthening of the 
public oversight in all Member States. The mid-term goals on the other hand were an 
improvement of the sanctioning system, the attempt to make the audit profession more 
transparent, strengthening of audit committees and internal controls, and enhancing auditor 
independence and liability. This Communication is furthermore significant as it demands the 
establishment of an Audit Regulatory Committee to prove that auditing regulators are 
independent from EU policy-makers. (Dewing and Russell, 2004a) The second one involves 
amendments to the company law and corporate governance in the EU. It proposes among 
others the adoption of annual corporate governance statements and more independence of 
audit committees. (ibid) 
Following these two Communications, the European Commission had issued the Statutory 
Audit Directive in 2006 as a major rewrite of the initial EU 8th Directive from 1984. The basic 
notion was to make legislators and regulators fully aware of what they are supposed to do by 
providing a proper due process, public oversight and transparency across the EU Member 
States. (McCreevy, 2006)  
 
Looking back at this timeline, one could think that the Enron scandal was the only trigger for 
why the SAD has been developed in the EU. That is however only the half-truth. The SAD 
has been developed due to several reasons that are not all related to the Enron scandal or to a 
crisis situation. The factor of crisis is certainly important but other events have equally 
triggered the major change of the audit regulation. The following part will thus describe all 
crisis-related and other reasons that led to the issuance of the SAD in the EU. 
The Enron debacle has given the European Commission an important incentive to work 
further on a harmonised audit market and on rewriting the EU 8th Directive. Reasons were on 
the one hand the new introduced SOX in the United States and on the other hand also the 
pressure of the national parliaments to work together in order to improve audit quality and 
reliability. The American PCAOB introduced a new regulatory framework, called SOX, 
shortly after the financial scandal of Enron. Sarbanes Oxley included in that scope to conduct 
extraterritorial oversight of all EU companies and EU auditing firms that were listed in the 
US. The EU's response was an expression of concern towards these extraterritorial outreach 
effects. The reason for that was not a disagreement over the measures of the new SOX but the 
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different cultural and legal audit environments both the USA and EU were situated in. 
According to the EU, mutual recognition of each other's high quality regulatory systems 
needed to be achieved. That meant, the US had to accept that the EU is able to find effective 
solutions to the issues raised by the scandals. (EC, 2003a) The SEC and the PCAOB had 
however not recognised this concept and as a consequence the EU started to develop an 
improved regulatory framework that would establish independent public oversight in all 
Member States. Frits Bolkestein, former member of the European Commission, stated in that 
context (EC, 2003b): "I do not accept the imposition of US Standards on our firms and that is 
why the EU strongly opposes registration of EU audit firms with the US' PCAOB. The EU 
will regulate its own business." 
The 2004 Parmalat scandal symbolises another trigger for the development of the SAD. The 
EU had felt the post-Enron reaction of the American standard-setters via their extraterritorial 
requirements but were not directly pressured by European stakeholders to improve the audit 
regulatory system. That changed however when financial scandals also emerged in Europe. 
Parmalat was the most prominent scandal that involved two firms of auditors as well as 
fraudulent management behaviour. As a consequence, the EU parliament exerted pressure to 
develop new, more efficient and stricter audit regulations for all its Member States. (FEE, 
2005) 
The growing financial globalisation symbolizes the third trigger for the issuance of the SAD. 
In order to follow the ongoing globalisation of multinational companies, audit regulatory 
systems also need to be adapted. The EU tried to react to that by expressing their wish to 
create a common market in audit services. That means the issuance of similar laws and 
regulations, as well as the principle of mutual recognition for professional qualifications 
across its Member States. Only a common level of assurance and credibility could thereby 
provide common auditing practices standards and clarify how an audit should be performed. 
(Dewing, 2004) Thus, the abrogation of the EU 8th Directive and implementation of the SAD 
would lead to harmonised auditing practices across the EU and that would in turn enhance the 
status of European auditing practices with third countries. (Inwinkl et al., 2008) In addition, 
the EU tried to minimize the "audit expectation gap" that arises through corporate business 
failures and the perception of the public of what managers and auditors should have done. 
(Dewing, 2004) The public expects managers and their respective auditors to always act 
ethical. When a business fails whether due to managerial fraudulent behaviour, auditor's 
mistakes or other economical reasons, the audit expectation gap increases because the public 
gets more and more dissatisfied with the outcome. In order to minimize that audit expectation 
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gap, the European Commission has decided to develop a stricter auditing framework in form 
of the SAD, that will restore the trust of the public in a sound audit work. 
The last reason that could be held responsible for the development of the SAD is the Financial 
Service Action Plan from 1999. It aimed to harmonise the European capital market by issuing 
several regulations in the fields of financial reporting, statutory audit and corporate 
governance within specific timeframes set for the next six years. That means, the FSAP had 
already recognised that legislators and regulators needed to work together on an international 
level in order to protect the capital markets from coming economical and financial crises and 
to meet the demands of the increasing globalization. (Dewing and Russell, 2004a) 
 
 
5.3 Implementation of the SAD 
The SAD had been approved in September 2006 and "provides a basis for effective and 
balanced co-operation between regulators in the EU and with regulators in third countries, 
such as the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). It also includes the 
creation of an Audit Regulatory Committee to complement the revised legislation and allows 
the speedy adoption of necessary implementing measures." (Soltani, 2007:162) That means, 
the SAD has not only been introduced to enhance the audit quality and restore the trust into 
the audits of companies but also provides specification for what is required of legislators, 
regulators, and auditors. (Holmquist, 2008) 
The general content of this directive describes thereby firstly the required duties, 
independence and ethics of auditors, secondly the emergence of a public oversight for the 
accounting and auditing profession, and thirdly the implementation of an external quality 
assurance system for both auditing and financial reporting processes. In addition, international 
standards on auditing were introduced as the new common language across the European 
Union as well as a tool to improve the cooperation between international regulatory oversight 
bodies. (Braiotta, 2005) 
 
The explicit measurements of the SAD are as following: 
 approval, continuing education and mutual recognition; 
 registration; 
 professional ethics, independence, objectivity, confidentiality and professional 
secrecy; 
 auditing standards and audit reporting; 
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 quality assurance; 
 investigations and penalties; 
 public oversight and regulatory arrangements between member states; 
 appointment and dismissal; 
 special provisions for statutory audits of public-interested entities; 
 international aspects; 
 transitional and final provisions. (EU, 2006:91-107) 
These measurements are described via various articles that specify exactly how Member 
States are supposed to implement the requirements into their national law and when they need 
to latest comply with this EU directive. (EU, 2006) The deadline for implementing all SAD 
requirements had thereby been set for June 2008. Thus, the EU is at the moment engaged in 
checking the actual state of compliance of all its members. It publishes for that purpose a 
scoreboard on the transposition of the SAD on a regular basis. The latest one from March 
2009 illustrates that more than half of all Member States have accomplished the transposition 
process. Non-transposed requirements comprise areas like third-country cooperation, audit 
committee, and some smaller auditor duties. (EC, 2009) 
In spite of those small non-transposed areas, the requirement of establishing an independent 
public oversight board has presented the biggest challenge for the EU Member States. Its 
introduction is supposed to help restoring the confidence of investors into the capital market 
again but at the same time calls for changes in all national audit regulatory systems. Most 
Member States do not have an independent public oversight incorporated into their regulatory 
system but rather trust the government or appropriate governmental groups to oversee the 
audit profession. (Holmquist, 2008) Thus, the question arises why an independent public 
oversight for every Member States is so important. An answer is surely the extraterritorial 
oversight of the USA and the attempt to establish equal bodies on the EU and Member State 
level. Another answer could be in regard to the public interest, i.e. independent oversight will 
provide more credibility and trust into the audit work and thus, reassure the unsatisfied 
stakeholders. (Manuzi, 2009) 
There are though different levels of public oversight that have to be implemented. It does not 
just work to have an oversight function on the global scale but it has to be persistent on all 
levels. When looking at the SAD implementation, the IFIAR has been established on the 
global level, the EGAOB on the European level, and the respective national auditor oversight 
committees on the Member State level. (ibid) 
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The articles 32-36 of the SAD describe thereby what is expected of the individual Member 
States in regard to the public oversight. Article 32 defines the principles of the new to-be-
established oversight board in every Member State. Articles 33 and 34 include requirements 
to cooperate and mutually recognise others' regulatory arrangements. And articles 35 and 36 
describe ethical aspects, like the designation of another competent authority to support the 
work of the oversight board, and professional secrecy. (EU, 2006) 
 
In order to support that transposition process of the Member States, two other international 
forums were established on the EU-level as a by-product of the SAD: the Audit Regulatory 
Committee (AuRC) and the European Group of Auditors' Oversight Bodies (EGAOB). The 
first one cooperates with the Commission by analyzing the existing national public oversight 
systems and by developing some minimum standards for them. The latter one represents 
rather the equal counterpart for the other levels of implementation, i.e. at global level with the 
International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) as well as with the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), and at national level with the appropriate 
oversight boards. (Manuzi5, 2009)  
There is however also an inter-relationship between the AuRC and the EGAOB which 
diagram 3 will now illustrate. 
 
Diagram 5: Audit regulation on the European level 
 
          adopted from ICAEW, 2009 
                                                 
5
 Martin Manuzi is the European director of the Insitute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. 
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The Audit Regulatory Committee (AuRC) on the one hand has been established in 2005 and 
consists of representatives of the relevant national ministries, i.e. the Ministry of Economics 
and Technology for Germany. The European Commission acts thereby as the chairman. Its 
main goal is to delegate authority in respect to implementing measures. In other words, the 
committee is responsible for the comitology measures6 in the EU. In the last two-year 
transposition period, several comitologies were issued by the AuRC. Examples can be found 
in the Recommendation on quality assurance (2008) and the Decision on a transitional period 
for third country auditors (2008). (ICAEW, 2009) 
The European Group of Auditors' Oversight Bodies on the other hand was established in 
December 2005 and consists of representatives of the public auditor oversight committees in 
Member States that are non-practitioners. The representative of Germany will in this case be 
the APAK. (ICAEW, 2009) The establishment of the EGAOB has thereby resulted from two 
events: the emergence of various public oversight bodies all over the world and the 
modernisation of the EU 8th Directive. The group has however not been entirely new founded. 
The in 1998 established Committee on Auditing was replaced by the new body EGAOB but 
did not exactly adopt the same functions. That means it was only a replacement of bodies than 
an adoption of same working methods. (EC, 2008a) 
Its main goal is to ensure an effective coordination of all the auditor oversight committees 
from the Member States. Subgroups are thereby supporting the work of the EGAOB by 
assisting in technical matters about what the SAD requires from Member States for their 
national implementation. According to McCreevy7 (2005) the EGAOB is to help "make 
public supervision systems a reality in all 25 Member States. … It is a key initiative in our 
drive to bring EU audit rules into the 21st century and restore faith in the profession." (EC, 
2005) A second task is to prepare comitology measures that are important for delegating 
decision-making procedures from the European Commission to the right national committees. 
(EC, 2005) It is however not able to make any formal decisions or votes. The last task 
involves the preparation of current discussion matters for the meetings with the national 
ministries at the AuRC. (EC, 2008a) 
Additionally, all EGAOB members are also a member of the new established International 
Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) which has the purpose to provide a basis for 
an exchange of information and experiences between the different audit regulators. The forum 
comprises of independent oversight authorities from all over the world that are responsible for 
                                                 
6
 The term 'comitology' describes where a directive delegates the implementation of specific measures to a 
specialised Committee. 
7
 Charlie McCreevy is the EU Commissioner for the internal and financial services markets since 2004.  
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not only sharing knowledge about the audit market and the experiences of its supervisory 
bodies, but also for promoting international cooperation. (IFIAR, 2009) That means, the 
APAK is the representative for Germany and participates in the various meeting within a year. 
 
Recapitulating does that mean that these international forums help not only the Member States 
to exchange information and experiences but also contribute to the ongoing communication 
between the European Commission and the national oversight boards. The consequences are 
that additional opinions, recommendations and regulations are issued after the initial issuance 
of a specific audit regulation from the European Commission. 
One of the most important one is thereby the 2008 Recommendation on external quality 
assurance for statutory auditors and audit firms auditing public interest entities. It has been 
issued by the European Commission because of the increasing number of external quality 
assurance systems in audit firms and oversight bodies across Europe and elsewhere. In order 
to avoid any conflicts, the Commission had decided that inspections should be performed by 
independent oversight bodies instead of the audit firms themselves. Another reason lies in the 
requirement of the SAD to establish a quality assurance system in all the EU Member States. 
The national legislators and regulators need to have a common understanding on how auditor 
oversight and inspections should work before being able to establish a common basis for 
cooperation. (EC, 2008c) 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
In summary, it can be stated that there has been a long history of audit regulations in the 
European Union. Starting off with the EU 8th Directive in 1984, the European Commission 
had set a first sign to achieve a harmonised capital market. The following two decades were 
however characterized by global financial scandals, economical crises and extraterritorial 
pressures from the USA which led in turn to more changes in the regulatory system of the EU. 
Efforts of the European Commission to overcome these obstacles, as well as to minimize the 
audit expectation gap and create a common audit market were ultimately brought together 
with the issuance of the SAD. That new directive aims to firstly enhance the audit quality by 
specifying more requirements for auditors and demanding an independent public oversight 
board in every Member State, and to secondly restore the trust of investors into the capital 
markets again. The transposition of the SAD symbolizes thus a major challenge for every 
single Member State as it requires considerable changes in the national regulatory systems.  
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6. Chapter Six: The SAD and German audit regulations 
Developing audit regulations is a complex task for any regulatory body, whether national or 
international. It is dependent on cultural, legal-political, and economic factors. That means not 
one legislation is uniform with another one. Traditionally, most national governments 
determine which audit requirements and standards will be put into law. Germany in contrast is 
a different matter. Its auditing profession is already incorporated into German law and that 
means that the profession itself can make recommendation on which standards should be 
incorporated. (Radebaugh et al., 2006) That means that whilst legislation is made by lawyers 
and the Ministry of Justice and Finance, it is at the same time open to consultation by 
individuals, practitioners and academics. The consequence of this openness is that legislation 
is quite often politically debated. (Evans, 2007) 
The following sections will describe how the SAD has been translated into German 
legislation, introduce the general audit regulatory system of Germany and explain what the 
Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz (BilMoG) has to do with the implementation of the SAD. 
 
 
6.1 Adoption process in Germany 
The Statutory Audit Directive provoked by financial scandals, the globalised economy and the 
accelerated internationalisation of the auditing profession has led to an incremental 
implementation process in Germany.  
European legislators started discussing ways on how to improve the audit regulatory system 
after 2003 which means that people got an idea of what was on the way. The passage of the 
SAD took however a couple years time before it got accepted on 17 May 2006 and requires 
all Member States to enforce the requirements until 29 June 2008.  
In the case of Germany, a part of this new directive had already been a component of its 
national law. To mention are thereby especially the two amendments of the 'Bilanzrechts-
reformgesetz' (BilReG) and the 'Abschlussprüferaufsichtsgesetz' (APAG) from 2004 that 
introduced regulations towards the independency of auditors as well as led to the 
establishment of the Auditor Oversight Commission (APAK). Up-to that moment, the 
German auditing profession had been self-regulated by a professional body. Investors and the 
general public had however problems with trusting that self-regulatory system in view of the 
various emerging financial scandals of that time. Furthermore, an international cooperation is 
only possible between equal parties, i.e. independent oversight bodies. Yet, German 
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legislators had to establish the APAK in order to be part of that international cooperation and 
to pave the way for its international acknowledgment. (Inwinkl et al., 2008) 
After the issuance of the SAD in mid 2006, European legislators and regulators discovered 
that there were still many issues left for further discussion and hence, started a negotiating 
period in order to decide on what type of implementing measures were applicable.  
German legislators decided throughout that period to introduce the 'Berufsaufsichtsreform-
gesetz' (BARefG) in 2007 in order to meet the European requirements. It symbolizes another 
amendment of the Public Accountant Act by enhancing the authority of the authority of the 
regulatory commission. Special focus was set on the new inspection system, foreign auditor 
requirements, and on the cooperation with equivalent regulators outside the EU. (Marten, 
2008)  
There are however still parts of the SAD that have not been transposed in Germany. The goal 
of German legislators is thus to complete the requirements of the EU directive by issuing or 
revising further regulations. They also hope to gain more credibility within the public auditor 
oversight on a national and international scale as well as to guarantee a permanent trust into 
the auditing methods and system by implementing all the requirements of the SAD. (APAK, 
2009d)  
The published draft bill of the BilMoG from May 2008 is thereby the attempt of the German 
government to transpose the remaining requirements into national regulation. It has just been 
passed by the German Parliament on 27 March 2009 as well as later on by the Federal 
Council of Germany on 3 April 2009. The whole process has taken longer than expected due 
to more pressing issues like the financial crisis and its impacts on the German capital market. 
(WPK, 2009b) 
 
Altogether, there had been lots of discussion among German politicians about the way the 
SAD should be implemented into German legislation. The requirements of the SAD are a task 
the German government has to deal with and to integrate in the best possible way into their 
national legislation. Prof. Dr. Marten also stated throughout the telephone interview that "the 
implementation of the SAD is not a challenge but a task the German legislator has to cope 
with. It is a task, a task for cooperation that will take some time but will be manageable". 
And that is true when looking at the implementation process in Germany. Legislators and 
regulators have continuously worked on incorporating the EU requirements by starting with 
the establishment of the auditor oversight commission in 2005, amending the German Public 
Accountant Act several times in the period of 2004 to 2007 and by finishing with the new 
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BilMoG which will furthermore have considerable implications towards the German 
Commercial Code as well as the Public Accountant Act. (Marten, interview) 
 
Diagram 6 does not only illustrate exactly these impacts of the SAD on the German 
legislation but also emphasizes on the additional provisions Germany has to deal with while 
transposing the EU requirements into its regulatory system.  
 
Diagram 6: Impact of the SAD on German legislation 
 
adapted from Marten (2008:3) 
 
The SAD has become effect on 29 June 2006 and demands from the EU Member States to 
transpose its details within a two-year transposition period. The left upper box of diagram 6 
illustrates some details of the general framework of the SAD. Public oversight, quality 
assurance and investigations as well as mutual recognition are thereby of special interest for 
the implementation into national legislation. As described in the beginning of this chapter, 
Germany had the luxury of already having some of these requirements incorporated into their 
legal framework. The remaining parts were dealt with in 2007 by the BARefG and in 2009 by 
the BilMoG. The 2007 amendments are here illustrated in the left lower box of diagram 6 and 
refer to the Public Accountant Act. The 2009 amendments are in contrast illustrated in the 
right upper box and symbolize changes in the German Commercial Code. 
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Both amendments have however led to by-laws that are issued from the Chamber of Public 
Accountants and are not specifically asked for by the SAD but are necessary for the German 
legal framework to implement the European requirements. 
 
The following subchapters will thus focus on these two amendments by introducing the 
German audit regulatory system before and after the issuance of the SAD and by describing 
more specifically the contents of the BilMoG. 
 
 
6.2 Structure of the German audit regulatory system 
The German audit profession emerged from two historical roots: the foundation of the first 
association of auditors in 1896 and the setting-up of trust companies by larger audit firms.  
It has however first been formally organised in 1931, together with a revision of the company 
law. The first big systematic change happened with the establishment of the WPK in 1961. 
Auditors were then forced to be members of the WPK and the chamber was given certain 
legal rights by the German government, like to carry out the professional examinations, 
supervision of the profession and disciplinary actions. That means in other words that the 
WPK with its employed auditors, self-regulates its own profession. In addition to that, the 
Public Accountant Act (WPO) had been established as the basis for all audit and accounting 
regulation in Germany. (Evans, 2007) 
The new guidelines of the Statutory Audit Directive have however lead to a change in the 
existing auditing regulatory system in Germany by demanding the establishment of an 
independent oversight. The basic notion of the SAD is that a high auditing quality across all 
member states can only be achieved via continuous monitoring. (Heininger8, 2008) Thus, all 
auditors and auditing firms have to be under supervision of a public independent body that is 
responsible for the following sectors: 
 approval and registration; 
 acceptance of auditing principles and standards, as well as of standards for internal 
quality assurance; 
 further training as well as quality assurance, investigation and disciplinary control 
systems. 
                                                 
8
 Heininger is a German auditor and member of the board of the Institute of German Auditors. 
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In order to fulfil these tasks, the public oversight body has to have certain legal rights that 
enables it to investigate auditors and to initiate appropriate measures. (Heininger, 2008) Its 
high ethical standards are thereby necessary to avoid any conflicts of interest. Only non-
practitioners are allowed to be nominated. Otherwise the prospective employee has to follow 
a three-year cooling off-period by not being employed or in other ways involved with an 
auditing firm. Also, oversight board members shall be nominated by a proper, transparent and 
independent process and that means not to be employed by the government either. (EC, 
2008b)  
 
Diagram 7 will thus show how this basic notion has been incorporated into the German 
regulatory system and in what way it differs from the self-regulation by professionals that 
existed beforehand. 
 
Diagram 7: German audit regulatory system 
 
Adapted from Marten (2008:6) 
 
 
The legal corporation of the WPK was the responsible regulator of the audit profession since 
its establishment in 1961 and consists by now of more than 20.000 members. The overall aim 
is thereby to guarantee that the demands and expectations of the public and the State towards 
the auditing profession will be fulfilled. It is however not an independent oversight body as it 
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employs auditors and chartered accountants. Before the SAD had been issued in 2006, the 
WPK was supervised by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology in regard to the 
compliance with laws and regulations. In order to deal with all the different issues arising 
throughout the years, the WPK cooperates closely with other professional bodies, like the 
Institute of Public Auditors in Germany (IDW9). Together, they discuss urgent matters and 
then publish a common statement. The issuance of the SAD in 2006 however changed that 
legal framework a bit. The WPK is now also supervised by the APAK in regard to specialised 
professional auditing subjects and all matters regarding the cooperation with foreign oversight 
bodies got reassigned to the APAK. (WPK, 2009a) That means that the WPK and the IDW 
deal with issues inside Germany and the APAK with issues that affect also other countries. 
The main statutorily regulated tasks of the WPK are though the supervision of the profession 
with the conduct of quality assurance inspections, the appointment of auditors and chartered 
accountants, and the representation of the concerns and opinions of the profession towards the 
public and the politics. (ibid) Furthermore, the WPK has the right to take actions against legal 
violations, i.e. to impose sanctions. Its conduct is thereby supervised by the APAK, as the 
latter one has the right to scrutinize the decision of the WPK. The potential sanctions are 
divided into three ranges: a 50.000 EUR sentence followed by a Court decision; a 500.000 
EUR sentence followed by a temporary suspension from active audit work; and an exclusion 
from the audit profession altogether. (EC, 2008b) 
 
With the establishment of the Auditor Oversight Commission (APAK) in 2005, Germany set 
not only an important sign for the independent self-regulation of its auditors and auditing 
firms but was also one of the first Member States to incorporate a public oversight into their 
national regulatory auditing system. Before the SAD got developed, the Chamber of Public 
Accountants (WPK) had played the most important role in the German auditor oversight 
regime. That changed however with the establishment of the APAK. (APAK, 2009a) 
The six to ten members of the APAK are required by article 32 of the SAD to be non-auditors 
as this should ensure the independency of the public oversight. (EU, 2006) They are 
furthermore nominated by the Ministry of Economics and have a cooling off-period of five 
years, which in turn symbolizes a stricter rule than the three years required by the SAD. (EC, 
2008b) This structure is unique in the history of audit regulation in Germany as it shows that 
                                                 
9
 The IDW consists of German public auditors and public audit firms and has the aim to represent the interests of 
its members at national and international level. For that purpose, it does not only cooperate closely with the 
WPK but is also a member of the IFAC. (IDW, 2009) 
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the APAK is not governed by public law but symbolizes an independent regulation of the 
audit profession. (APAK, 2009a) 
The overall goal of the APAK is thus to enhance the compliance with rights and duties of 
statutory auditors. More explicit tasks are the professional oversight, quality control, the 
establishment of professional ethics as well as national and international cooperation with 
equal partner organizations. In order to carry out these tasks, the APAK has been given the 
ultimate decision-making power, i.e. it is free and independent of instructions, as well as the 
ultimate competency in all of its supervised areas, i.e. its competency is beyond the typical 
state supervision. (APAK, 2009b) Furthermore, it supervises the fulfilment of all the legal 
obligations of the WPK by having been provided with certain comprehensive rights: 
 participation in meetings and information update; 
 right to perform inspections in proceedings that are related to public oversight; 
 right to ask for a re-examination of a WPK decision; 
 right to give instructions to the WPK under the abrogation of its decision; 
 right to arrange a consultation meeting with all experts. (APAK, 2009c) 
The APAK is thereby divided into two panels that are responsible for the main fields of public 
oversight and quality assurance. (APAK, 2009d) In order to provide a high degree of 
expertise, the APAK is also a member of several European and international forums as well as 
cooperates with other public oversight bodies. The participation in the IFIAR and EGAOB are 
important to exchange experiences and information regarding the changing auditing 
environment and practices used all over the world. The cooperation function of the APAK 
furthermore enables Germany to represent its interests with one independent body and at the 
same time obtains acknowledgement on a global scale. 
 
Looking back at the overall new structure of the German audit regulatory system and the 
requirements of the SAD, it becomes obvious that Germany has complied. It has not only 
established an effective system for auditor oversight, equipped the APAK with ultimate 
responsibility and filled with non-practitioners, but also kept the initial regulating bodies 
before the issuance of the SAD in place. The WPK is still an important regulator for the 
oversight of auditors and auditing firms in Germany but it is now subject to the APAK. In 
order to make that transitional period smoothly, certain by-laws are necessary. This topic will 
however be thoroughly covered by chapter 7. 
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6.3 Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz 
In order to implement the remaining requirements of the SAD, Germany's legislators and 
regulators have decided to do that in form of the Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz 
(BilMoG). It provides in general comprehensive alterations of the German accounting and 
auditing rules, as well as reforms to the annual report verification and corporate governance. 
The introduction of the BilMoG has however taken a longer time than expected by any 
legislators or regulators. After year-long delays, the draft bill had finally been published in 
November 2007. However, according to the nature of the legislation process in Germany, 
politicians and academics are allowed to give their inputs to the new proposed law. That 
means that over the course of these discussions, the BilMoG had been modified several times. 
A reason for this lies in the necessity to account for all possible occurring financial problems 
and to incorporate solutions into the new to-be-established law. In regard to the latest events, 
the German parliament and Federal Council needed to deal with questions that emerged due 
to the contemporary global financial and economic crisis. Sensitive subjects, like the 'fair-
value-accounting' for financial instruments in trade, had to be considered before passing the 
new law. (Marten, interview) As a consequence, the BilMoG has been passed by the German 
parliament on 26 March 2009 and by the Federal Council on 3 April 2009. That means 
German auditing firms will have to comply with the new requirements for all the financial 
years after 31 December 2009. Though, organizations can already voluntarily follow the 
BilMoG for the coming financial year.  
The BilMoG is with regard to the interview with Prof. Dr. Marten thereby "nothing else than a 
re-modelling of the German Commercial Code (HGB)". Germany has regulated all its 
accounting and auditing rules by law in the HGB. In comparison, the SAD requires among 
others changes in the auditing process as well as the implementation of ISAs, and that means 
the German legislator can only obey these requirements by changing its Commercial Code. 
There is no alternative law in Germany that allows changes in this dimension. Prof. Dr. 
Marten furthermore stated that the BilMoG did not symbolize a "surprise for the German 
audit profession. Yet, it remains to be seen if the extent of changes and amendments will be 
accepted and can fulfil the wish of the German legislator to not only comply with the 
requirements of the SAD but also to make the Commercial Code more modern and 
competitively viable. " 
 
Another aspect is that the significant amendments of the BilMoG are not only limited to 
commercial laws but also include the German tax law and corporate governance codex. One 
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explicit measure in regard to the public oversight is the establishment of an audit committee 
within an organization (No.59 BilMoG). The tasks of this committee are to monitor the 
accounting process, the effectiveness of the internal control system, and the audit of all 
statements within a financial year especially in regard to the independence of auditors. 
(Deloitte, 2008) 
Another measurement is the international required networking rule. A network is thereby 
considered as the collaboration of people to pursue common interests for a certain period of 
time. If a person of this network audits an organization's financial reports, then other members 
of the same network are not allowed to offer any consulting services to the same organization. 
This new rule has been introduced to fulfil the requirement for auditor independency by the 
SAD. As a consequence, the German legislator has decided to enhance the networking rule 
even further and not allow any person who is considered to be part of a network (i.e. having 
auditing and consulting firms in the same network), to conduct an audit of annual accounts. In 
addition, a five-points catalogue has been issued that distinguishes exactly who is considered 
to be in a network and who is not. (Inwinkl et al., 2008) 
The BilMoG also contains the obligation to use ISAs for the conduct of an audit for any size 
of company that is situated in Germany as well as the requirement to link the audit of annual 
accounts from public interest entities with the cooling off-period. The latter one is an 
important instrument to guarantee the independence of auditors. The responsible audit partner 
of a company is thereby not allowed to take up a manager position within two years after the 
completion of the audit work in exactly this business. (Inwinkl et al., 2008) 
These three new rules of the BilMoG represent the biggest changes for the audit profession in 
Germany as they have far-reaching impacts on both, the audit firms and their clients. In the 
past, the HGB has been changed in a two-year rhythm but has never reached the extent of the 
BilMoG. And that shows that the BilMoG will in fact be the biggest change of the HGB since 
1985. (Marten, interview) 
 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The Statutory Audit Directive was required to be translated into national law by June 2008. 
The German regulatory system has shown that some parts of the directive have however 
already been incorporated by former amendments of the WPO and the establishment of an 
independent public oversight board, called APAK. The latter one was a unique step for the 
German legislators, as the APAK is not governed by public law. It has furthermore led to a 
Chapter Six: The SAD and German audit regulations 51 
restructuring of the audit regulatory system by putting the APAK in charge of the WPK and 
therewith modifying the decision-making power. 
The remaining parts of the SAD are expected to be implemented with the help of the new 
BilMoG. It was a tedious process to get that new law passed by the Federal Council and 
Parliament, as the German legislation is open to consultations from practitioners and 
academics. Accordingly, the BilMoG got postponed several times but got finally adopted in 
April 2009. It provides significant amendments to the HGB by for example demanding the 
establishment of an audit committee in every organization and by introducing a network-
related independence rule for auditing firms.  
The following chapter will thus focus on special issues that affect the German auditor 
oversight. 
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7. Chapter Seven: Effects on the German auditor oversight 
The Statutory Audit Directive had to be translated into each EU Member State law by summer 
2008. According to Prof. Dr. Marten (2009), the implementation of the SAD is thereby an 
obligation of each Member State and not a task of the European Union itself. The 
Commission is only responsible to monitor the transposition and if necessary to impose 
sanctions for non-compliance.  
German legislators and regulators are thus responsible for finding the appropriate legal ways 
of how to best integrate these European requirements. The independent auditor oversight is 
thereby probably one of the most important measures to regain the trust of stakeholders into 
the capital market. Germany has for that reason incorporated the APAK. It has however 
already been established in 2005 before the SAD was published, i.e. the German government 
had anticipated the coming European audit developments. (Heininger, 2008) As a result, the 
APAK had a longer time than most other Member States to deal with its new role and 
implement the requirements of the SAD. In this context, Prof. Dr. Marten stated that on the 
one hand the establishment of a public oversight in Germany has been fulfilled but on the 
other hand, there are still little areas remaining that are in need of amendments. These areas 
mainly comprise of ambiguities in regard to the EU requirements of inspecting the quality 
assurance systems of audit firms and cooperation with other oversight bodies.  
Thus, this chapter will describe more explicitly how these two areas are being dealt with in 
Germany and what issues are in need for more clarification. 
 
 
7.1 Inspections 
The main task of German regulators is to comply with audit duties, i.e. to implement a quality 
assurance system that ensures a high audit quality and enhances the trust in the effectiveness 
of the German oversight system. 
The initial idea of inspecting the different quality assurance systems of auditing firms has 
thereby arisen from mainly two sources. The first one derived from the European aim to 
obtain international acknowledgement, especially in regard to the PCAOB. (Heininger, 2008) 
And second from the Recommendation on external quality assurance that was issued by the 
European Commission in May 2008. It concretes the requirements of the SAD in regard to 
methods, organizational structures and independent inspections. As a consequence to this 
Recommendation, Germany restructured its process of the auditor oversight and quality 
assurance system. The reasons for that were the attempts of the German legislators to not only 
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obtain the European Commission's and international acknowledgement by making the 
oversight body APAK more independent from auditing firms, but to also enhance the 
importance of the German capital market and business location. The APAK itself stated in 
this context that it is necessary to translate the Recommendation of the European Commission 
in order to show that Germany is compliant with the SAD and to get the necessary 
international acknowledgement. (APAK, 2009d) 
There are however some obstacles that arise when looking at the current practices of the 
APAK. They are mainly to be seen in regard to the ways inspections are integrated into the 
German legislation. 
 
Quality assurance procedures for German audit firms have already existed prior the EU 
required inspections. German legislators had implemented a system which evaluates the 
various quality assurance systems of small- and medium sized German auditing firms by so-
called monitored peer-reviews issued by a government agency. Nonetheless, Germany 
introduced the active oversight measure of inspecting the quality assurance systems of 
auditing firms in 2007 but had the difficulty that it was not immediately linked to the 
operational decision-making power of the APAK. The WPK established a division called 
unprovoked inspections that consists of only professionals. Its operational responsibility as 
well as the execution of its inspections lies thereby with the WPK. The first problem is 
however that the WPK is an entity of public interest that oversees auditors but at the same 
time employs professionals and that is contrary to the requirement of the SAD to be an 
independent public oversight body. The APAK is the only auditor oversight in Germany that 
complies with the independent oversight requirement but it can only influence decisions of the 
WPK with external legal effects. That means operational decisions, like the design of the 
inspection process, are not part of the ultimate decision-making power of the APAK. This 
second problem has to be dealt with as the European Commission requires all Member States 
to inform them to what extent the inspection process has been implemented until May 2009. 
(APAK, 2009d) 
The German legislators have thus started to work on solving these obstacles. In summer 2008, 
the WPK introduced a project panel on inspections with the aim of developing 
recommendations for the reform of organizations and the execution of inspections which then 
shall be incorporated in the WPO. In order to support the work of this panel, the APAK has 
participated in all its meetings. The result was the issuance of several recommendations for 
the reform of organizations and the conduct of inspections (2008) which did not only assign 
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the decision-making power for the execution of unprovoked inspections and the public auditor 
oversight to the APAK, but also enabled the APAK to ask for help from an appropriate body, 
like the WPK. The difference to the present system is that the APAK will get the unlimited 
decision-making authority on the operational level. (APAK, 2009d) A future task is thus to 
enshrine these recommendations in German law and show the European Commission that it 
symbolizes the appropriate translation of the European requirements on quality assurance 
systems within audit firms. 
Up-to-now, the APAK and WPK, have as a result of this cooperation, revealed several 
shortages of quality assurance throughout the 34 inspections they have conducted in 2008. 
(APAK, 2009d) However the question is, how will the German regulators will deal with these 
shortages. Will they impose though sanctions even though Germany is still in the early stages 
of translating the requirements of the 2008 EU Recommendation into national legislation? 
In order to find the appropriate measures for dealing with this, a cooperation with the EGAOB 
and IFIAR is essential to exchange experiences as well as to ultimately find a German 
solution that complies with European and international practices for independent inspections. 
(APAK, 2009d) 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to clarify who is chosen to be inspected before looking at the 
outcomes. There are three approaches the WPK as the responsible inspector can follow.  
The first one is a combination of a conscious selection of WPK employees that is based on 
risk factors, and statistical randomness. The risk factors are thereby based upon profession 
characteristics, affiliation to certain stock markets or professional key issues. The second 
approach is linked to the APAK because it has the right to assign the WPK to conduct an 
inspection. That means, if the APAK suspects a specific audit firm of malpractice or simply 
wants to investigate a certain auditor, it has the power to order the WPK to do that job. 
(Heininger, 2008) The third approach is related to a certain number of engagements. The 
German legislators have determined that audit firms with more than 25 audit engagements 
will have to be inspected annually, whereas audit firms with less than 25 engagements only 
have to be inspected once every three years. (EC, 2008b) 
The representatives of the WPK have thereby the right of access and inspection, i.e. they are 
allowed to visit the offices of auditors and auditing firms during the official business hours to 
search documents as well as to make copies. When looking at Germany, that means there are 
about 180 auditing firms and approximately 4.500 auditors that could be inspected. 
(Heininger, 2008) These high numbers represent in turn a lot of work for the WPK as it is also 
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obliged to take legal actions against those audit firms that are not complying as well as to 
convey the collected information to the European Commission. (ibid)  
Thus, the process of an inspection is important. First, the to-be inspected firms will be 
informed at short notice of the inspection in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the 
procedure. Auditors and firms are obliged to completely cooperate with the respective 
inspectors, i.e. the rule of confidentiality is lifted by law and employees of firms only have the 
'right to silence' in regard to orally given information. Second, the inspectors examine two 
main areas: the internal quality control system (e.g. partner remuneration, policies) and 
selected audit engagements (e.g. compliance with professional rules). At the end of the 
inspection process, the APAK receives a draft report from the WPK employed inspectors that 
will then be publicly but anonymously published. If the inspectors find any non-compliance 
with professional rules, the respective firm will be charged with disciplinary sanctions. If the 
inspectors however find any deficiencies in the internal control system, then the findings will 
be presented to the quality assurance department and might lead to a withdrawal of the 
certificate to perform statutory audit in the EU. (Marten, 2008) 
 
Of special interest is moreover the spill-over effects of the EU required inspection measure on 
the established monitored peer-review in Germany. It remains to be seen if that will rather 
lead to a disqualification of the existing German measurement, a double burden or to an 
improvement. (Heininger, 2008) Generally speaking, German legislators want to keep the 
monitored peer-review tool as that has proven to be efficient. In order to combine both 
methods, they will however have to find a way to define each other's boundaries and make 
them supplement each other. 
For example, the monitored peer-reviews are specified in accordance with §319a HGB, i.e. 
the scope of who is to be monitored. The paragraph demands of all German companies to hire 
an audit firm to check the financial statements. If the European Commission required 
inspections that relied on the same paragraph, medium-sized auditing firms would feel a 
significant extra burden as they would have to follow the European requirements as well. The 
American PCAOB has in contrast dealt with that problem by restricting its inspections to the 
audit of capital market oriented companies. That means medium-sized audit firms are not part 
of any inspections. (Heininger, 2008) 
 
These listed challenges of integrating the EU requested inspection process into the existing 
German legislation show that there are still issues that need to be further resolved. The 
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European Commission together with the APAK will work on improving that by continuous 
updates and an exchange of experiences with the other Member States' regulators. 
 
 
7.2 Cooperation 
Cooperation is one of the most important words in today's globalised economy and hence 
plays an essential role in the Statutory Audit Directive. The national public oversight bodies 
of all Member States are required to work together, exchange experiences and other 
information as well as to cooperate with supervisory committees from third countries.  
Germany as the prime example has legally established the APAK as the counterpart for 
national and international oversight bodies as well as for other international organisations. 
The APAK has thereby the agenda to convey the German oversight status to other countries, 
establish new relations as basis for a successful cooperation and to achieve full reliance with 
third country standard setters. Yet, there are some challenges that arise with this agenda, like 
mutual recognition, homeland principle or full reliance of the PCAOB. (APAK, 2008) 
 
In order to describe these challenges of cooperating in a more structured way, I will divide 
them into three parts: challenges within the EU, with third countries, and with international 
bodies. 
The EU regulatory system shows that the European Commission has no influence whatsoever 
on the national oversight boards of its members. The German APAK is only bound to the 
German legislator. The European Commission and Parliament can however provide 
consulting services that will allow a certain information flow between them and the various 
national auditor oversight boards. An important requirement of the SAD is furthermore the 
cooperation between these boards about transnational matters. For example, if a French 
organization is listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange, the APAK will not enforce an 
inspection of the respective French auditor. Instead it will trust the inspection results of the 
French auditor oversight committee. The principle of homeland regulation is thereby the basis 
for all cooperation. (Marten, interview) More precisely, the homeland principle says that 
foreign auditors and auditing firms do not have to register when the foreign country's 
oversight board is equivalent. (APAK, 2008) That shows the effort of the EU to avoid a 
double oversight. Transnational cooperation of inspections has in fact been accomplished 
several times in 2008. Yet, mutual recognition is not a given. Legislators and regulators tend 
to rather trust their own oversight boards than foreign ones. The SAD requires nonetheless 
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that Member States have to acknowledge the sound work of each other's oversight boards. 
That means that only mutual trust can lead to successful cooperation among the national 
oversight boards. 
 
There are further challenges that arise while European oversight boards cooperate with 
countries outside the EU. The most important country is thereby the USA as its standard 
setters have established a very strict regulatory system that also has extraterritorial impacts on 
the EU. Issues are thereby in regard to joint inspections and full reliance. The SAD requires 
that inspections of auditing firms outside the EU are done cooperatively. However, up-to-now 
there has not been any intention from neither the European side nor the American side to fulfil 
this requirement. Prof. Dr. Marten stated in the interview that "this might be a future 
challenge but it will all depend on the political and economical situation of both parties 
involved". There have been several meetings between the PCAOB and the APAK in order to 
solve this ongoing issue. The APAK together with the other members of the EU strive to get 
the full reliance of the PCAOB in regard to their audit regulatory systems. And that means no 
joint-inspections but mutual recognition of each other's sound work. For that purpose, all 
national oversight boards tend to issue a so-called 'adequacy decision' that would clarify the 
issue of confidentiality. It should determine that the foreign audit oversight boards follow 
confidentiality rules and thereby allow the transfer of working papers. Hence, a new basis for 
the cooperation with third countries would be established. The PCAOB in contrast does not 
want to abolish the instrument of joint inspections as it firstly likes to keep its extraterritorial 
influence on the EU and secondly does not entirely trust the new regulatory system whose 
transposition deadline has just passed in mid 2008. (APAK, 2009d, p.17) 
 
Other challenges for the public oversight boards in the EU can be seen in regard to their 
cooperation with international bodies. The EGAOB was foremost established to provide an 
exchange of experiences within the EU. It is however also an advisor to the European 
Commission and is responsible to develop cooperation plans. The SAD awaits from the 
establishment of the EGAOB that national oversight boards, like the APAK, provide their 
own experience in order to refine the requirements set by the Commission and improve the 
regulatory system in Europe even further. (APAK, 2008) The new established IFIAR in 
contrast consists of independent oversight authorities from all over the world. It is a platform 
for an exchange of information and experiences. According to Prof. Dr. Marten, an exchange 
of information however has though no implication on the auditing market in any Member 
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State. Moreover, most German auditors and auditing firms do no know of the existence of the 
IFIAR. And that shows that the IFIAR as platform of information exchange has not yet 
accomplished to reach the lowest level, the audit profession itself. The German APAK tried to 
deal with that obstacle by being elected for the Advisory Council of the IFIAR in September 
2008. That new Council consists of representatives of different public oversight boards and is 
responsible to support the work of the chairman of the IFIAR. With the election into that 
Council, Germany was able to host one of the several workshops about inspection that are 
organised throughout the year. The purpose of them is to enhance cooperation between the 
EU members and to also make the IFIAR as international platform more known to the 
national auditing firms of the respective host-country. (APAK, 2009d) As if these were not 
enough challenges for the national oversight bodies to cooperate with the EGAOB and IFIAR, 
the SAD also requires them to cooperate with other international groups, like the World Bank 
or the International Organisation of Securities Commissions. (APAK, 2008) And that means 
additional work for exchanging information with those groups or even to cooperate on 
establishing additional agreements or rules. 
 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
The public auditor oversight in Germany has been established partially due to the crisis-
related situation in Europe, and partially due to the requirements of the SAD. New tasks and 
assignments were therewith introduced but at the same time led to challenges for the German 
legislators and regulators. Inspection processes and required cooperation efforts with other 
European oversight boards or international bodies play thereby a central role.  
The SAD requirement of inspection intervenes into the existing quality assurance system of 
the German auditor oversight, i.e. German legislators have to find a solution to either combine 
the old system with the new inspection process or to develop an alternative. Regardless of 
what solution is found, the APAK is exposed to an extra load of work to ensure a sound 
quality in all German auditing firms. The required cooperation of the national oversight 
boards with other parties symbolizes additionally a challenge of coordinating this task. Mutual 
recognition is thereby the key for success but it remains to be seen how well national 
oversight boards in the EU will in fact deal with that. It is not only the acknowledgement of 
each other's regulatory systems but also the successful cooperation with the PCAOB and 
international bodies that will lead to a complete implementation of this SAD requirement. 
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8. Chapter Eight: Analysis 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the empirical data presented in the previous chapters, in 
regard to my problem statement and research questions and to link that to the theories of 
chapter two. 
I will start off by looking back at the anticipatory model from chapter 2.1 and analysis that in 
regard to the audit regulatory system in the EU. 'Travel of ideas', institutional theory and the 
audit culture will additionally help to explain why audit regulations change. The second part 
of this chapter will then look closer at the initial problem statement and analyse that in regard 
to the SAD implementation and more specifically to the auditor oversight in Germany. 
 
 
8.1 The anticipatory model in the context of the changing audit regulations 
As explained in the theoretical chapter 2.1, the anticipatory model was initially developed by 
Olaniran and Williams (2001) for any kind of businesses. I will however use this model to 
show how audit regulations change in the EU and will thereby emphasis on Germany as my 
prime example. Diagram 8 thus illustrates an adapted anticipatory model that links all the 
theories from chapter two to the main research topic of audit regulation within the EU. 
 
Diagram 8: Adapted anticipatory model 
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According to Seeger et al. (2001), the emergence of a crisis symbolizes a common part of an 
economic cycle. Both, crisis and economic recovery help to exploit the full potential of an 
economic sector. The auditing profession is thereby no exception. Looking back at the last 
decade’s history of crises (as described in chapter 4.1), it becomes obvious that crises 
triggered changes in the audit regulation. It is not the only trigger that leads to audit changes 
but it is most certainly an important one. A crisis either in form of an economic downturn or a 
financial scandal leads in most cases to a reconsideration of the existing audit regulatory 
system. Investors loose their trusts into the capital markets and ask the responsible 
governments for solutions. In the past, the EU has dealt with this by making amendments to 
its audit regulations, i.e. issuing directives, recommendations, and communications, in order 
to force its Member States to change their national regulatory system as well. And that shows 
that a crisis is not only a threat but also an opportunity for future development. The EU had 
always had the aim to harmonise its capital market. The different emergences of crises might 
have interrupted that development at first but ultimately triggered a faster response of the 
respective EU legislators and regulators to make the situation better and therewith accelerated 
the process to achieve a harmonised capital market. 
For this reason, I have chosen to use the anticipatory model to explain in more detail how 
audit regulation changes in the EU. I will furthermore focus on my case study Germany in 
order to analyse how a new idea, i.e. an amendment, travels onto the national Member State 
level. 
 
Having an anticipatory model in the auditing field in place helps to deal with a crisis because 
pro-active measures allow for a much faster and more efficient response of the respective 
legislators and regulators. Understanding the circumstances of a specific crisis is thereby 
inevitable for the decision-makers in order to develop a post-crisis action plan. The 
anticipatory model as presented above in diagram 8 consists thereby of three components: 
expectations, enactments, and the relevant environments. 
 
Expectations are assumptions of people that have an interest in a certain topic. In the case of 
the European auditing profession, stakeholders, auditing firms and international standard 
setters, like the SEC, have expectations of how auditing should be. That means, they expect 
the regulatory system to be stable and to ensure the credibility of the capital market. The EU 
strives to obtain a harmonised audit market which leads in turn to even higher expectations of 
all parties involved. Thus, the decision-makers need to take the potential crisis environment 
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into consideration and implement measures that assure the overall aim for a harmonised 
market.  
Events that trigger audit changes might be on the one hand economic crises or financial 
scandals, and on the other hand the objective of having a common audit market within the 
EU. Those events are however all dependent on a place, time and agent. When looking for 
example on the Enron scandal: it took place in the United States in 2001/2002 and its agents 
were the company itself as well as its responsible auditing firm Arthur Andersen. Thus, it 
represented the signal for the starting point of the global financial crisis that ultimately led to 
the issuance of the SOX in the USA and amendments of the European audit regulatory 
system.  
Pre-conditions as another aspect for varying expectations could be interpreted in regard to the 
different auditing cultures in every Member State. There are different traditions for issuing 
regulations. Some countries have oppressive regulators that make it more difficult to adopt 
new laws and others have softer regulators that are more open to changes. Thus, pre-
conditions are an important factor to be considered when trying to understand the different 
expectations of stakeholders, auditing firms and international standard setters. Depending on 
what the expectation is based upon, one might expect much more from the audit regulatory 
system in the EU than others. For instance, Germany's regulatory system is based upon a 
more democratic arrangement. Legislators make a recommendation for a new law which is 
then open to political and academic input. The Federal Council and Parliament discuss this 
input in many sessions before issuing the actual law. That shows that expectations from 
German stakeholders and auditing firms will be influenced by the auditing culture that is 
existent in their country. They expect that the regulators deal with a specific issue when 
occurring but do not expect an immediate action. The BilMoG is a prime example for that. 
The German government had proposed this law in the end of 2007 but it had taken one-and-a-
half years to be legally accepted. Yet, the German public has not protested or demanded a 
faster procedure. 
Post-crisis events can be considered as another factor for expectations. Most crises bring 
consequences to the economic sectors they are emerging in. And that in turn affects the 
expectations of the parties involved. When looking at the Enron scandal for instance, post-
crisis events like the SOX with its extraterritorial requirements as well as encompassing 
effects on the international financial sector have led to changing expectations in the EU. 
Stakeholders from all around the world demanded stricter auditing regulations, and 
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international standard setters expected the regulatory system of the EU to adapt to the 
standards set by the SOX. 
The analysis of these factors showed that expectations of stakeholders, auditing firms and 
international standards setters are dependent on the context of an emerging crisis. 
Expectations are however also influenced by the relevant environments, i.e. in the case of the 
European audit profession by the EU and national level. Before going into more detail of how 
much the respective environments promote changes in expectations, I will however analyse 
the interrelationship between expectations and actual enactments for the European audit 
regulatory system. 
 
Enactments are actions that are undertaken to deal with a critical situation and are dependent 
on how well information is available. That means decision-makers have to develop some kind 
of post-crisis action plan to satisfy the expectations of other interest groups and to find the 
measures that are appropriate to preserve their own interests. When looking at crises in the 
auditing field, European legislators on the highest level develop an action plan which is then 
sent to the lower level, i.e. to each Member State. For instance with the emergences of the 
Enron scandal in the US and the Parmalat scandal in the EU, the European Commission and 
Parliament had collected the needed information, took expectations of different interest 
groups into consideration and then developed a post-crisis action plan by issuing the Statutory 
Audit Directive. The latter one is a specific action that was needed to deal with the critical 
situation in the financial markets at that time. The SAD gave the Member States however a 
certain degree of freedom for how to implement its requirements into national legislation. 
That means Germany, as my case study, chose certain actions which were again dependent on 
information derived from the German audit market. German legislators had to develop a post-
crisis action plan that suited the situation in Germany and not elsewhere, i.e. their actions 
were only developed to deal with the situation in Germany and to help anticipate for future 
crises. That action plan consisted thereby of the issuance of two amendments (the BilReg and 
the BARefG), the establishment of the APAK and lastly the development of the BilMoG. 
Counteractive strategies are thereby satisfying tools to develop actions. They can be used in 
form of prevention, maintenance, correction or mitigation. These tools are used by legislators 
and regulators on both the EU and the Member State level. On the EU level, secondary 
legislation in form of directives, recommendations and decisions, enables the supervising 
authorities to implement its counteractive strategies. It depends thereby on whether the 
respective crisis leads to a preventive, maintaining, corrective or mitigative mode. On the 
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Member State level, German legislators and regulators have the same choices but are 
controlled by the framework set by the EU. Evaluating the relevant environments is thus a 
necessity to find the right measures. 
 
The original anticipatory model – illustrated in diagram 2 – from Olaniran and Williams 
(2001) has the relevant environments divided into an internal and external focus. In order to 
make that model suitable for the audit regulatory system in the EU, I have thus exchanged the 
internal with the Member State focus and the external with the EU focus.  
Audit regulations are developed on several levels whereby the EU level symbolizes the higher 
one. That means regulations are developed, issued and passed on to the lower level, the 
Member States. External forces, like the economy, politics and media, have an additional 
impact on the EU level as the ultimate decision-maker in the auditing profession. All 
economies are nowadays intertwined which means that the emergence of a crisis in one 
economy will lead to spill-over effects. As a consequence, several fundamental questions 
were raised about how capital markets are regulated and supervised. Charlie McCreevy 
answered that accordingly: "We need to build a global dialogue to work together towards 
independent high quality audit oversight." (McCreevy, 2008:4) That means regulatory 
cooperation on the EU level is important to minimize the external economy forces that 
become intense during a crisis. The external force of politics plays furthermore a significant 
role as political pressure from other countries could lead to changes in the regulatory system. 
The EU level represents thereby the unified entity of all Member States and it is thus more 
exposed to political decisions in the field of auditing that especially come from the USA. 
The Member State level in contrast is more exposed to internal forces, like rigidity and 
control. Audit regulatory systems vary between countries because the national auditing 
culture determines how effective governance in a country can be, what type of regulator is 
needed and how much comparability is achievable. Rigidity symbolizes thereby the 
inflexibility of the regulatory system to implement fast and efficient actions to deal with a 
certain situation. Some Member States have audit regulators that are unable to react fast to a 
crisis situation because the regulatory system they are embedded in does not allow for quick 
changes and rather leads to controversies. Germany in contrast has a regulatory system that 
encourages the dialogue with non-regulators in order to issue rules and regulations that help to 
cope with a crisis situation in the best possible way. Yet, that makes the process of enactment 
rather slow. One example is the passage of the BilMoG. It was scheduled for 2008 but with 
the emergence of the financial crisis, new issues had arisen that regulators and academics had 
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to firstly clarify. And that whole process led to a 6-months postponement of the new law. The 
internal factor of control symbolizes moreover the influence of national legislators and 
regulators to change the respective crisis situation with the help of legal means. Germany's 
legislators and regulators chose to use the legal means of amending its Commercial Code as 
answer to the EU issued SAD and therewith maintain control of how to deal with future 
crises. The current financial crisis for instance has led to many new issues in the financial 
world and ultimately to a mistrust into the capital market. The recently incorporated legal 
measures (e.g. independent public oversight committee, and inspections procedures) will 
however help the German legislators and audit regulators to control the crisis impacts in the 
future in a better way. 
 
That implies that although the audit environment is influenced by various internal and 
external forces, there is a significant need for legal measures that are issued on the EU level 
and then have to be implemented on the Member State level. Audit regulations are however 
rarely precisely defined, meaning that Member States have some kind of freedom in what way 
they can implement the requirements. It is thus important to analyse the travel of ideas (in 
form of new regulations) in the sense of how do they travel from the EU level to the Member 
State level and how are they then translated into national legislation. According to 
Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) are ideas powerful instruments that after their successful 
implementation lead to changes in their environment. The application is thereby dependent on 
how well the new idea is communicated and thus also dependent on space and time. Most 
ideas emerge indeed in a crisis situation. Some might become translated and some might just 
stay an idea. But in order to get an idea implemented, it has to be objectified in a specific 
space and time on the EU level, translated into the Member State legislation and lastly be 
debated about the exact means by which the idea travels. 
So, let’s take a closer look at how the new idea of the SAD travelled from the EU level to 
Germany. 
The SAD was among others developed as a consequence of the Enron and Parmalat scandals, 
i.e. the European Commission proposed a modernization of the 1984 EU 8th Directive and 
objectified that by issuing the Statutory Audit Directive in 2006. The legal nature of a 
directive requires all Member States to incorporate the EU requirements into national 
legislation within a certain transposition period. Germany thus had two years time to decide 
upon the form and methods of implementing the SAD. The chosen forms were several 
amendments of the Commercial Code and the establishment of an independent public 
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oversight board. The initial notion of the SAD was outlined in a framework and that means 
communication has to be an important instrument to ensure that the implementation on the 
Member State level represents that notion from the EU level. A framework allows for 
interpretations, e.g. Germany chose to significantly amend its Commercial Code and 
authorize the oversight board with considerable power. Yet, the SAD did not ask for changes 
in the Commercial Code or for how to integrate the independent oversight board into the 
national regulatory system. It requested independence, certain responsibilities, ethical aspects 
and cooperation efforts with other oversight boards. The German legislators adopted these 
requirements but at the same time chose to advance some of them. Examples for them are the 
stricter networking rule for audit work and the longer cooling off-period for members of the 
APAK. It has however to be stated that the regulators on the EU level try to communicate 
their vision by providing an advisory role for their Member States. On the one hand, the 
European Commission ensures a certain information flow to its Member States and on the 
other hand, international committees (e.g. the EGAOB and IFIAR) were established to 
provide an exchange of information and experiences between all EU members. 
As the transposition period has passed in summer 2008, the EU is now concerned with 
examining the national implementation status and if necessary to impose sanctions. It is 
however already obvious that the idea of the SAD and its travel to the Member States has 
changed the audit environment in Europe. National audit systems are not self-regulated 
anymore; instead a more harmonised market environment with mutual recognition and 
cooperation has been established. Jörgen Holmquist as the Director General for the Internal 
Market and Services at the European Commission argued that only cooperation, i.e. relying 
on others and the establishment of independent public oversight systems can help to restore 
the trust in the capital markets and work of auditors again. (Holmquist, 2008) 
That shows that the many expectations on the audit regulatory system in the EU have led to 
various counteractive strategies whether issued on the EU level in form of secondary 
legislation, or on the Member State level in form of the transposition of EU regulations or 
additional by-laws. Yet, it remains to be seen why the auditing profession changes its 
regulations at all. 
 
With regard to the institutional theory from DiMaggio and Powell (1983), every unit of a 
population seeks for external legitimacy by adhering to specific rules and norms. And that in 
turn will lead to similar adoption processes that are called 'institutional isomorphism'. The 
resulting change can thereby be caused by political power, the desire for institutional 
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legitimacy or competition. The audit profession with its regulatory system is no exception to 
that. Audit regulations in the EU change because the legislators and regulators want to 
legitimate their regulatory system towards the other international standard setters outside the 
EU, and because the emergence of any kind of crisis leads to a political necessity to regain the 
trust of investors into the European capital market. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have identified three mechanisms that are responsible for 
making a unit of a population change: coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism. I will 
however only use the first two mechanisms to analyse how audit regulations in the EU change 
because the factor of uncertainty does not account for any mimetic pressures in the audit 
regulatory system.  
Coercive isomorphism represents the pressure from other organizations, cultural expectations 
or governments. The audit regulatory system in the EU is exposed to pressures of foreign 
standard setters, like the PCAOB, cultural expectations that arise in the different auditing 
cultures of the Member States and of the European Commission itself. The result is that the 
regulatory systems will become more and more alike due to the changing audit regulations 
(e.g. SAD, Recommendation on external quality assurance) and maybe even lead to a global 
harmonised audit market in the far future. Furthermore, these coercive pressures lead to an 
increasing awareness of the preferences of the society by taking the expectations of the 
stakeholders and auditing firms in consideration before issuing any new audit regulations.  
Normative isomorphism symbolizes in contrast the pressures from the professionalization, i.e. 
the audit profession. The members of an occupation define rules and regulations, control the 
outcome and establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy. The 
European Commission together with other consulting bodies, that mainly consist of 
professionals, define what rules and regulations are appropriate for the audit occupation. They 
further control the adoption and implementation of these rules in all Member States. In order 
to establish a cognitive base, the European Commission has issued the SAD that shall 
represent the starting point for the EU audit autonomy from other foreign regulatory systems. 
These normative pressures can lead to a revision or renewal of the existing audit regulations. 
Furthermore, professionals must not only conform to the standards set by the European 
Commission but also to the ones set by the respective Member State legislators. For instance, 
German auditing firms have to adapt to the translated national requirements of the SAD and in 
addition to the ones German legislators and regulators have set in the German Public 
Accountant Act (WPO). 
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That means altogether, the audit profession as the respective unit of a population here, will 
always seek for external legitimacy by adhering to rules set by the EU and the national 
governments.  
 
Summarizing, the theoretical reflections of Olaniran and Williams have firstly helped to 
analyze the different influences the audit regulatory system in the EU is exposed to and 
secondly provided a model that incorporates other theories, like travel of ideas, institutional 
theory and auditing culture. All theories together have shown that auditing regulations are 
dependent on the relevant environments, the expectations of the involved parties and on the 
enactments of the respective regulators. 
It is thus important to look back at the problem statement and to specify what implications 
thereby arise for the changing audit regulations in the EU and in Germany. 
 
 
8.2 Implications 
The initial problem statement asked how audit regulation is changed in the EU. The recent 
issuance of the Statutory Audit Directive on Germany as member of the EU, has thereby 
formed the basis for my research as it symbolizes a major change of the audit regulatory 
system in the EU. Thus, the question remains how that change had exactly taken place and 
how it had affected the German regulatory system.  
 
The triggering events can thereby be related to the crises emergences in the last two decades 
as well as to non-crisis related issues. Starting in the 1980s where the public asked why 
auditors had not done anything to prevent the financial scandals from that time. The 
consequence was the development of the EU 8th Directive in 1984 and with the following 
years, the directive got more and more important as other scandals came along. Yet, the EU 
also issued a Recommendation on independence and quality control as well as developed the 
FSAP whereby both had nothing to do with a crisis. These two events were rather related to 
the power of the regulatory bodies themselves and their wish to create a harmonised capital 
market in the EU. 
Hence, audit regulation does not only change through the event of crisis but also through 
factors, like globalisation, increasing pressure from other international standard setters and the 
aim of the EU itself to establish a harmonised market environment. 
Chapter Eight: Analysis 68 
The SAD for example was on the one hand an answer to the Enron and Parmalat scandals and 
the American issued SOX but on the other hand symbolized the European wish for a 
standardised audit market as well as a response to the increasing globalisation of the 
organizations to be audited. The financial scandal might have advanced the process that 
would have otherwise taken a longer time to evolve.  
Also, the European issued SAD has led to major changes in the existing regulatory systems of 
its Member States. Germany as my prime example here amended its Commercial Code, 
established a whole new independent public oversight board and is still working on how to 
integrate the specific tasks for that oversight board into national legislation. It is much easier 
to issue a new regulation on the EU level as it provides a framework but not specific measures 
on how to translate the requirements. That is the task of national legislators and their 
interpretations of the framework issued on the EU level. It is however true that the issuance of 
the SAD had the effect to make national auditing regulations less important. There is no self-
regulation anymore, instead every Member State has to follow the rules and regulations of the 
SAD. The aim is thereby not to determine that high quality audits are sufficient. It rather 
means that stakeholders need to trust the audit opinion. The independent oversight boards 
required by the SAD will thereby contribute to that high level of quality assurance by making 
sure that auditing firms follow the necessary rules. Yet, that alone will not promise the needed 
success. National governments also have to take responsibility by ensuring the establishment 
of fully operational and staffed audit oversight systems and that within the transposition 
period issued by the European Commission. (McCreevy, 2008)  
The German legislators have done that by providing the legal basis for the establishment of 
the APAK and for all its tasks and responsibilities, i.e. it is fully operational. That process was 
however not as easy as it sounds. The APAK was established over the course of a two-year 
transformation process and has still some areas that need to be further discussed. Examples 
for these are in regard to the decision-making power and the required inspection measure.  
The APAK was established with a certain degree of decision-making power, yet, it was 
initially not assigned to make any operational decisions in regard to the inspection process. 
That means the effectiveness of the APAK was limited because the measure of inspection is 
crucial to ensure the audit quality of all German auditors and auditing firms. In order to 
overcome that obstacle, the German legislators have recently issued a Recommendation that 
will transfer the decision-making power for the execution of any inspections to the APAK. It 
is however only a recommendation and that means it remains to be seen how long it will take 
to incorporate that into the German legislation. The advantages of this new recommendation 
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are though not only that it associates with the initial notion of the 2005 published APAG to 
redesign the regulatory system in Germany, but that it also enables the prompt and easy 
communicable translation of the 2008 EU Recommendation. And finally, the implementation 
of the German recommendation could lead to an enhanced international acknowledgement of 
the German regulatory system. (APAK, 2009d) 
The measure of inspection as second example bears challenges in itself. The APAK has yet 
not decided in what dimension the EU measure should be incorporated into German 
legislation. Small- and medium sized German auditors and auditing firms are already subject 
to the monitored-peer review system. Is it thus wise to impose a double burden on these firms 
by introducing inspections with the same dimension? The APAK is currently discussing on 
how to solve this problem and some members tend to abolish the old German measure of 
monitored-peer reviews in favour for the inspection measure. This suggestion would however 
entail further amendments of the German Commercial Code as all measures have to be made 
statutory. Another solution could be to follow the American model that restricts the 
inspections to capital market oriented companies. That would mean that German small- and 
medium-sized auditing firms are not subject to any inspections from the APAK and hence, do 
not have to comply with the additional requirements set by the EU. They will only have to 
follow those rules that are established both in the German Public Accountant Act and the 
German Commercial Code for their size of enterprise. In spite of that exception, small- and 
medium-sized auditing firms will still be monitored in regard to their quality assurance system 
by the help of monitored peer reviews that are under the oversight of the APAK. 
 
These two examples demonstrate that the issue of having an independent national auditor 
oversight board in place is challenging. It requires precise definitions that need to be stated in 
the national laws and regulations as well as to be in compliance with the SAD requirements, 
and it should encounter for every possible scenario that might arise in the near future. The 
contemporary financial crisis is thereby an important subject. It had led to a postponement of 
the BilMoG which is supposed to implement the remaining requirements of the SAD into 
German legislation. The main reason for that was probably the concerns of the Parliament and 
Federal Council towards the implications of the financial crisis. Their members wanted to 
considerate more closely those areas that were touched by the crisis, e.g. the fair-value-
accounting for financial instruments in trade or the going-concern assumption of the to-be-
audited companies. In addition, influencing lobby groups (e.g. banks, other regulating bodies) 
were also asking the German legislators for a postponement of the BilMoG as it entails a time 
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requirement to create the legal basis for it. The financial crisis has influenced the economy in 
Germany, thus, legislators, regulators and lobby groups are more concerned with overcoming 
these problems first than introducing a new time-consuming law that will lead to a major 
amendment of the Commercial Code. Yet, this postponement could be a problem for the 
German legislators as the European Commission had set the transposition deadline for the 
SAD for June 2008. That means that those parts of the BilMoG that represent the remaining 
implementation of the SAD could have only been introduced after the final passage by the 
German Parliament and Federal Council in April 2009. It remains to be seen how the 
European Commission will react to that after the current revision of the implementation status 
of the SAD. The fact is however that the contemporary financial crisis is not only affecting 
Germany but all the other Member States of the EU as well and that means that the European 
Commission will probably be more considerate. The most important goal at the moment is to 
overcome the financial crisis and the tool of inspection is a starting point to provide a stable 
capital market. The German inspectors will for that purpose not only look at the coming 
financial statements of all capital market oriented companies and their auditors but also do a 
retrospective review until the financial year 2008. (APAK, 2009d) This will enable a 
consistent application of the new requirements of the German interpretation of the SAD as 
well as help to prevent future crises from happening.  
 
Altogether, the contemporary financial crisis has shown once more that it has an effect on the 
change of audit regulations. The EU issued another Recommendation on external quality 
assurance in 2008 and the German legislators postponed the BilMoG until April 2009 in order 
to solve new arisen questionable issues. The Recommendation demands thereby the execution 
of inspections by the independent national oversight board and closer cooperation between the 
regulatory systems of Member States. That means that legislators on both the EU and the 
Germany level, have taken the expectations of the stakeholders into consideration, discussed 
on how to improve the audit regulatory framework and then enacted new strategies. These 
legal measures have in turn lead to changes of the surrounding environment as the 
Recommendation demands for a statutory integration of inspections into national law as well 
as mutual recognition and reliance on foreign inspection processes, and the BilMoG entails a 
major amendment of the German Commercial Code that will not only affect auditors and 
auditing firms but also all organization with headquarters located in Germany. Diagram 6 
(from chapter 6.2) has illustrated exactly this context: the impact of the SAD on German 
legislation. On the one hand, the directive has led to changes of the Public Accountant Act by 
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establishing a public oversight committee, implementing the inspection process and by 
providing disciplinary court procedures. On the other hand, the directive has led to 
amendments of the Commercial Code and that does not only implement the remaining SAD 
requirements like defining the scope of an audit and demanding the establishment of an audit 
committee in every public interested company but also led to by-laws that will have a major 
impact on all German organizations. The reason behind those additional by-laws lies in the 
attempt of the German legislators to make its regulatory and accounting system more 
competitive and comparable and therewith obtain the acknowledgement of other standard 
setters within and outside the EU. 
That last example shows that audit regulations are influenced by various factors and hence 
change. It depends on the context and environment but audit regulations can be changed both 
on the EU and Member State level, whereas the initiative will always come from the EU as 
the top level. The implementation process of the SAD into German legislation has 
furthermore illustrated that European requirements are not only translated but also advanced 
to adjust to the national circumstances and needs of the Member State level. The consequence 
is that audit regulations that are issued on the EU level, will lead to their implementation on 
the Member State level but can therewith also lead to different interpretations, i.e. Member 
States can implement the audit regulations within a certain framework and thus, introduce 
either stricter or more lax national regulations.  
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9. Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
This research was concerned with the audit regulatory system of the EU by having formulated 
the following problem statement: "How is audit regulation changed in the EU? A case study 
of the implementation process of the Statutory Audit Directive in Germany." In that context, I 
have started off by presenting an introduction to the history of crises from the last two 
decades and by describing the general audit regulatory structure in the EU. Thereupon, I have 
explored why the SAD has been developed, how its implementation is affecting German audit 
regulation, and lastly how that process is explicitly affecting the auditor oversight in 
Germany.  
 
It was shown that crisis is an important trigger for changing audit regulation. Various crises 
from the last two decades have led to amendments of the European regulatory system. The 
Enron and Parmalat scandals were thereby the most important incidents that triggered the 
modernisation of the EU 8th Directive from 1984. Other factors have however also played an 
important role in this change. Firstly, the increasing globalisation of multinational companies 
demanded from auditing firms and their regulatory framework to adjust to that in order to 
keep up with the fast-changing environment. Secondly, the EU aimed to establish a 
harmonised European audit market and the crises in the beginning of the 20th century had 
given the European Commission another incentive to achieve that as fast as possible. And 
lastly, the European legislators wanted to diminish the audit expectation gap between the 
public and auditors that becomes relevant during every emerging crisis situation. The result 
was the issuance of the Statutory Audit Directive in 2006 and a two-year transposition 
deadline for the implementation into each Member State's national legislation. 
Germany as my case study, had the advantage of already having some parts of the European 
directive incorporated in their national legislation. The required independent auditor oversight 
board had been developed in the course of two amendments of the German Commercial Code 
from 2004. That means that the APAK was officially established in 2005 and German 
legislators could thereupon work on enhancing its authority. The remaining parts of the SAD 
were however more difficult to incorporate into the German legislation. A new 
recommendation from the European Commission in 2008 as well as the contemporary 
financial crisis led to postponements. Yet, the German Parliament and Federal Council have 
accomplished to pass the BilMoG in April 2009 that will translate the last requirements of the 
SAD. 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion 73 
The analysis showed that although audit regulations are issued on the EU level, their 
implementation on the Member State level is dependent on the interpretation of the national 
legislators and can be influenced by coercive and normative pressures. The legal means of the 
EU are in most cases a framework and thus, Member states will translate the requirements in 
the way they fit the best into their environment. That means institutional isomorphism as well 
as the travel of ideas theory have an impact on how audit regulation is changed in the EU. 
Public oversight was thereby the prime example in this thesis.  
The European Commission demanded the establishment of an independent auditor oversight 
board with ultimate decision-making power, and the tasks to trust other regulatory system 
within the EU as well as to cooperate with other oversight boards inside and outside of the 
EU. Germany had established the APAK that has ultimate decision-making power and is not 
only active in cooperating with other oversight boards in the EU but is also member of 
various international forums. Yet, the measure of inspection is probably the most 
controversial issue as there are many open questions that need to be answered in Germany 
before having accomplished a successful instrument to regain the trust of the investors into 
the capital markets again. Inspections had been introduced in 2007 but were linked to the 
operational decision-making power of the WPK. German legislators have tried to solve this 
problem by making several recommendations in 2008. It remains to be seen how long it will 
in fact take to incorporate these recommendations into German legislation and therewith fulfil 
the EU Recommendation on external quality assurance. The German regulatory system is 
predominantly legalistic but is, before any new law is passed, open to consultation from non-
legislators. That means the legislation process might take longer than in other countries. 
The issue of mutual recognition is furthermore challenging as it requires every Member State 
to have the same level of auditor oversight established. The German APAK tries to cooperate 
with other European oversight committees by following the homeland principle. It is however 
a different matter when looking at standard setters outside the EU. The PCAOB, as the 
counterpart to the national auditor oversight committees in the EU, has not yet fully 
acknowledged the European audit regulatory system by not entirely trusting the sound work 
of national auditor oversight committees. It requires instead the execution of joint-inspections 
and up-to-now does not allow the transfer of working papers. Whether or not that issue will be 
resolved, will depend on the future political and economical situation of both parties and if a 
consensus about confidentiality issues can be reached. 
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Nonetheless, the issuance of the SAD has led to major changes in the European audit 
regulatory system that will help legislators and regulators to regain the trust of investors into 
the capital market again. It will also enhance every Member State's regulatory system by 
establishing independent auditor oversight committees that cooperate with each other. That 
means, the European Commission has accomplished to be a further step closer to having set 
up a harmonised market environment within the EU. Yet, the factor of crisis will always play 
an important role as it is part of the economic cycle. The implemented requirements of the 
SAD will however help to anticipate prospective crises in a better way and thus, make the 
capital markets of each Member State more secure. In addition, the FSF has published new 
principles for cross-border cooperation on crisis management in April 2009. These principles 
describe firstly international cooperation between relevant supervising authorities about how 
to deal and manage financial crises and secondly, the setting up of a meeting point for 
national authorities to exchange information. (FSF, 2009b) This plus the ongoing 
communication of international forums, like the EGAOB or the IFIAR, will help to find 
common measures to best deal with emerging crises. 
The audit regulatory system of the EU will probably change several more times within the 
coming years, but the SAD has represented the biggest change so far. The final task of the 
European Commission is thus to monitor the transposition of the directive. Prof. Dr. Marten 
believes that the SAD has been implemented for its main parts in Germany. Whatever smaller 
areas still need amendments, every requirement of the SAD can or will be found in German 
legislation very soon. (Marten, interview) It remains however to be seen how well that new 
audit regulatory system will work in the future and if it will in fact help to make the capital 
market more secure. Cooperation as the basic notion of the SAD is a good thought but it 
depends on the willingness of the parties involved to work together. That means only the 
coming years will show how well thought-out the SAD really is.  
Additionally, the EU strives to get the acknowledgement of the PCAOB in regard to their 
auditor regulatory system. The SAD is a very good foundation to achieve similar systems of 
oversight within the Member States but will the PCAOB accept these without pressing to 
make inspections? Frits Bolkestein stated in 2003 that "The EU will regulate its own 
business." (EC, 2003b) and that means that the European Commission will make its audit 
regulatory system as strong and powerful as it needs to be to get acknowledged international-
wide and that it will not accept any foreign interference. 
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Appendix 1: Question guide for telephone interview with Prof. Dr. Marten (26.03.2009) 
– translated from German into English 
 
1. What are the implications of the Statutory Audit Directive on the German audit 
profession? 
2. What were the biggest challenges for Germany by adopting the requirements of the SAD? 
3. What was the reaction of the German WPK when the European Commission issued the 
SAD in 2006? And how did members of the APAK react to this new development? 
4. Germany is a member of the newly established IFIAR. What are the impacts of this 
organization on the German audit profession? 
5. Did the APAK have any kind of influence on how the Statutory Audit Directive had been 
translated into German legislation?  
6. Do you think the SAD has been completely implemented in Germany? 
7. The passage of the BilMoG has been postponed several times now. The original plan was 
to pass the new law in 2008. Do you know the reasons behind this postponement? 
8. Did the current financial and economic crisis have an influence on this postponement? 
9. What were the reasons for the remaining requirements of the SAD to be implemented in 
the form of the BilMoG? 
10. Does the EU have an influence on the working practices of the APAK in any way? 
11. Can you tell me about the cooperation efforts between the APAK and other members of 
the EU? 
12. What is the status of the acknowledgement of the German regulatory system from the 
PCAOB?  
 
 
